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In 2014, the West Africa region was confronted with 
the worst Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak ever 
observed in Africa, causing tragic loss of life, im-
pacting country economies and adversely impacting 
agriculture as well as food and nutrition security in 
the region. Governments, institutions and infrastruc-
tures struggled to cope with the enormous challeng-
es brought by the epidemic while the way of life of 
affected populations hung in the balance.
While the EVD outbreak is being contained over 
time, it is important to document lessons learned 
from this epidemic, given that such epidemics will 
very likely increase in frequency and gravity in the 
future. What did we missand which lessons did we 
fail to learn from previous outbreaks of Highly Path-
ogenic Avian influenza, SARS, MERS-Cov and other 
pathogens, that may have helped mitigate the dra-
matic situation we observed in West Africa? What 
systems should be put in place at local, regional and 
international levels to help anticipate and mitigate 
the risk of future outbreaks including on the agricul-
tural and food security sectors?
The impact of a major disease outbreak on food se-
curity and nutrition through reduced agricultural ac-
tivities in countries already affected by chronic food 
insecurity and malnutrition is also rarely quantified 
or underestimated and represents a double burden 
for populations facing both critical health conditions 
and unsteady access to nutritious and diversified 
sources of food. 
Countries and the international community alike 
therefore need to be better prepared for future out-
breaks, which requires understanding the driving 
forces that lead to public health emergencies and 
carefully examining their impact through a multi- 
sectoral lens. This calls for a renewed integrated 
and holistic approach to risk management beyond 
the health sector, which embraces the complexity of 
such events and recognizes their impact on all seg-
ments of affected societies and economies.
The work presented here provides an innovative 
contribution to the research already published on 
Ebola. It uses a market chain approach and provides 
an in-depth analysis of enabling factors, as well as 
limitations and constraints that influenced the resil-
ience and vulnerabilities of several market chains. 
It builds on a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral 
approach bringing together the expertise from vari-
ous disciplines and follows consultations with a wide 
range of experts in food security, disaster risk reduc-
tion, animal health, public health, epidemiology and 
anthropology, as well as actors of the agricultural 
market chains sector from the affected countries. It 
highlights the need to develop synergies between a 
variety of sectors and stakeholders; informing and 
involving the communities in the response mecha-
nism; strengthening international co-operation and 
interdisciplinary approaches; and making better use 
of science and innovative technological solutions to 
improve research efforts.
Finally, it paves the way to future studies that should 
be conducted to better understand the underlying 
causes of emerging infectious diseases such as Ebola, 
and explore the possibility of establishing trade corri-
dors to keep food systems functioning and avoid the 
double burden caused by diseases and the drastic 
loss of income as well as access to nutritious food by 
vulnerable populations who depend on agriculture 
as a primary livelihood.
Vincent Martin
FAO Representative in Senegal
Head of REOWA West Africa/Sahel
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The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone was unprecedented in mag-
nitude and caused a major public health and soci-
oeconomic crisis beginning in 2014 that will have 
multiple and long lasting repercussions on rural so-
cieties throughout the West African region. In ad-
dition to the tragic human death toll, the epidemic 
has severely affected agricultural market chains in 
the three countries. Indeed, beyond the disease itself 
and its dramatic public health impact, the measures 
implemented to limit its propagation (e.g. movement 
restrictions on collective transport, closure of weekly 
markets and borders) have had a tremendous social 
and economic impact on local communities that de-
pend on agriculture as their primary livelihood.
The proper functioning of market chains and the 
flow of agricultural products are key factors influ-
encing food and nutrition security. Communities are 
increasingly dependent on markets and their correct 
functioning for their food and nutrition security as 
revealed by food security studies conducted in the 
three countries (WFP-CILSS-FEWS NET, 2010; WFP-
Guinée, 2010; WFP-Liberia, 2010). 
In order to have a better understanding of the mech-
anisms by which agriculture, food security and trade 
have been affected by the EVD outbreak, a market- 
chain approach has been adopted in this study. 
It complements the FAO-WFP Rapid assessments 
and Crop and Food Security assessments (CFSAM) 
carried out between August and November 2014. 
Conclusions and recommendations are based on a 
literature review, thirty interviews with experts and 
market-chain actors, and a technical consultation 
meeting organized by FAO, with the support of 
Cirad in Dakar on 9-10 December 2014.
This study is the first attempt to use an innovative re-
gional multi-stakeholder and participatory approach 
since the beginning of the epidemic, and was under-
taken with a view to put into perspective the evolu-
tion of the disease in a broader agricultural and rural 
context. This approach has proven particularly rele-
vant and useful to coherently organize different sets 
of information on production, trade flows, restriction 
measures, markets and consumer behaviours as well 
as to identify targeted interventions and mitigation 
measures. The strategies and measures adopted by 
different maket chain stakeholders to mitigate the 
difficulties they faced as a result of the EVD outbreak 
have also been considered in this study and were 
taken into account when drafting the recommenda-
tions in section four. 
Seven market chains were selected for this study 
based on their importance to regional food security, 
the risks associated with Ebola and the extent to which 
they were disrupted by the outbreak. The market 
chains included rice, potatoes (as an example of 
horticultural products), cassava, palm oil, domestic 
animal products, bushmeat and cocoa in Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia.
The assessment shows that the EVD outbreak has 
disrupted the functioning of several cross-border 
agricultural market chains. Above all, it had a major 
negative impact on collecting and transporting ag-
ricultural production to consumption areas. This dis-
ruption stems from collectors1 reluctance to travel 
to contaminated zones (the number of traders de-
creased by 20 percent at the peak of the outbreak 
according to WFP) and, to a lesser extent, to trans-
portation difficulties arising from Ebola checkpoints, 
quarantine zones and the closure of certain borders. 
These obstacles also contributed to reduced farmers’ 
incomes (higher costs of inputs and lower negotiat-
ing power with collectors whose numbers decreased) 
and to instability of crop prices from geographi-
cal and seasonal normal patterns, thus establish-
ing an atmosphere of instability and uncertainty 
for both producers and consumers within these 
chains. Consumer price increases were limited due 
to the low purchasing power of an already poor pop-
ulation, which was further weakened by the global 
economic slowdown. Some reductions in crop prices 
were observed, including potatoes in Guinea which 
Executive summary
1 Buyers of agricultural commodities from local producers 
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are usually exported to Senegal (made impossible by 
the Senegal-Guinea border closure) and rice in the 
Kambia region of Sierra Leone (which normally ex-
ports to Guinea). 
Some market chains were more resilient and ab-
sorbed the shock of the crisis better than others. 
These market chains were thus more efficient in con-
tributing, directly or indirectly, to food access for the 
most vulnerable households. In this regard, the EVD 
epidemic represents a unique opportunity to expand 
the concept of resilience to a market chain system 
and identify the underlying causes of its resilience 
or greater vulnerability in the context of a systemic 
crisis. 
For example, faced with the absence of collectors, 
better organized producers were able to market their 
products themselves in consumption zones. With the 
closure of local markets, some sellers opted to be-
come street vendors. The consumption of imported 
rice partly decreased in favour of local tubers, and 
bushmeat in favour of fish or meat from domesti-
cated animals. New regional trade routes were used: 
through Mali to bypass the closure of the Senegal- 
Guinea border or coastal navigation to bypass the 
re-routing of shipping lanes. Thanks to their financial 
capacity, social networks and, more generally, their 
speculative capacity, some stakeholders were able 
to benefit from increased price differentials between 
production zones affected by the epidemic and con-
sumption zones.
However, other economic stakeholders within these 
market chains, mostly without storage capacities 
and with weak negotiating power, were more se-
verely hit by restrictions. The most affected were 
stakeholders within long market chains (cocoa ver-
sus cassava), more labour- and input-intensive chains 
(poultry versus fish or cassava), chains with weak 
market diversification (cocoa versus palm oil), chains 
involving perishable products (potato versus cassava) 
and chains employing salaried labour (industrial co-
coa versus rice).
This study also puts a special emphasis on the lo-
cal rice market chain since local rice is essential to 
the region’s food security. It is also emblematic of 
the epidemic’s impact on agricultural market chains, 
both upstream and downstream. Production was 
Map 1. Ebola outbreak : regional confirmed and probable cases as of 20 October 2014
 Source: World Health Organization (WHO)
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disrupted by illness, bans on gatherings, restrictions 
on the movement of people and the workers’ fear 
of going to their fields because of Ebola. These fac-
tors especially affected group farm work. Domestic 
trade flows that normally go from rice production 
areas, particularly hit by the epidemic, to consump-
tion areas were disrupted by restrictions on people’s 
movement and goods within the three countries. At 
the regional level, stakeholders in Sierra Leone’s lo-
cal rice market chain also faced difficulties exporting 
parboiled rice to Guinea. Rice imports, which were 
not significantly affected by the epidemic, were able 
to make up the deficit in local production, but this 
came with the disadvantage of increasing the three 
countries’ import dependence and national expend-
iture on food. 
The bushmeat market chain is also considered key 
in this crisis since it could be the source of spillover 
events. Even if such spillovers can be viewed as rare 
events, their consequences are nonetheless disas-
trous. This sector represents an important safety net 
from a nutritional and economic as well as cultur-
al point of view, and a means of controlling pests 
that damage crops. The EVD outbreak has affect-
ed the bushmeat market chain, but it is likely that 
apart from a lasting effect on the consumption of 
certain species (bats, non-human primates) and an-
imals found dead, stakeholders will return to their 
previous activity. The ban on poaching which was 
hurriedly implemented during the crisis was costly 
and had limited effect. It is thus essential that the 
broader scientific community reflect on realistic and 
proportionate measures to establish during such an 
epidemic using an intersectoral approach that takes 
into consideration the market chain’s environmental, 
health, food, economic and cultural aspects.
While the EVD outbreak is being contained over 
time, it is important to document lessons learned 
from this epidemic, given that such epidemics will 
very likely increase in frequency and gravity in the fu-
ture. Like many other emerging infectious diseases, 
Ebola poses a systemic risk. Using OECD terminol-
ogy (OECD, 2003), this is a risk that affects the sys-
tems on which society depends (health, transport, 
environment, telecommunications) and requires a 
systemic response, which is a new policy approach 
to risk management that includes developing syner-
gies between public and private sectors; informing 
and involving stakeholders and the general public; 
strengthening international co-operation and inter-
disciplinary approaches; and making better use of 
science and innovative technological solutions to im-
prove research efforts.
The severity of the EVD outbreak in Guinea, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia is due in large part to  increased 
movement of goods and people within the region 
and illustrates how intensly and rapidly a virus of 
this kind can spread in a globalized, interconnected 
world. Chain effects highlight the increasing inter-
dependence of geographic and economic spaces. 
These spaces can no longer close themselves off to 
ensure their own security because isolation tends 
to make them more fragile. The challenge in such 
circumstances is therefore to isolate the disease 
without isolating, and thus rendering fragile, what 
one seeks to protect. This is a growing problem in a 
globalized world, leading us to rethink the coordina-
tion of an increasingly vast network of actors. At the 
same time, this challenge also offers new opportuni-
ties to develop new forms of solidarity.
1By 21 January 2015, the Ebola virus disease (EVD) 
outbreak in West Africa had led to over 21 600 re-
ported cases, including more than 8 600 deaths. 
Sierra Leone is the worst affected country with 10 
300 cases (compared with 8 400 cases and 2 800 
cases respectively in Liberia and Guinea, the two 
other worst affected countries in the region) but has 
reported fewer deaths than Liberia (WHO, 2015). 
Case incidence is now declining in all three countries, 
although the outbreak’s evolution is still uncertain 
until the disease has been completely eradicated. In 
addition, it is likely that there is under-reporting in 
some areas with poor and overstretched healthcare 
services.
This unprecedented EVD epidemic is far more severe 
than the previous twenty-four outbreaks reported 
since 1976 mainly in Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Uganda and Sudan, and is having a dramatic 
impact on West African countries, especially Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. The impact is even more 
worrying given that these three countries were grad-
ually recovering from years of civil war and political 
upheaval and had been showing signs of economic 
recovery, especially Sierra Leone and Liberia (UNECA, 
2014), (Bank, 2014c). The epidemic is also taking 
place in contexts of mass poverty, poor health infra-
structure and fragile states, which explains its excep-
tional gravity and magnitude (UNDP, 2015).
Although the EVD outbreak is primarily a health cri-
sis, the disease has led to various economic and so-
cial disruptions in the most affected countries and 
neighbouring countries. The reactions of fear caused 
by the outbreak and the restrictions on gatherings 
and movements of goods and people had repercus-
sions beyond the direct impact on health2. Behav-
ioural effects – related to the way risks are perceived 
and handled – can often be more significant from a 
socio-economic viewpoint than the effects of sick-
ness and mortality themselves. Similarly, the policy 
responses implemented to contain the outbreak and 
protect public health may have perverse effects on 
other activities (e.g. trade and economics) and lead 
to higher indirect impacts than the disease itself. A 
number of EVD impact studies thus focus on the dis-
ease’s socio-economic impacts rather than merely 
the public health consequences. 
In particular, the EVD outbreak has strongly disrupt-
ed agricultural market chains within countries and 
across borders. Many different measures – qualified 
hereafter as “restriction measures” – have been es-
tablished by public authorities and/or community 
leaders (self-organized control) to limit the propa-
gation of the epidemic: closure of weekly markets, 
closure of borders3, Ebola checkpoints on the main 
roads to/from counties, districts or villages to con-
trol entries and exits by screening people for Ebola 
symptoms. These measures vary from one country 
to another (e.g. two compulsory days at home in 
Sierra Leone or curfew in Liberia) and change rapidly 
(e.g. temporary closure of markets). However, they 
all cause disruption in agricultural products market 
chains and trade, with potentially significant impacts 
on those who depend on them for their livelihoods 
and food and nutrition security. This is of particular 
concern because chronic food insecurity is already a 
major issue in the three countries and there is a risk 
that the epidemic could have long-lasting, negative 
effects on food security.
There is therefore a need to assess and understand 
Ebola’s impacts on market chains and food securi-
ty while continuing to address the health problem 
by preventing human-to-human transmission. Ebola 
Response should be addressed through multisectoral 
policy: public health policy is a priority but this must 
be linked to other policies such as agriculture, eco-
nomic, and food policies. 
To document the impact of these disruptions and 
draft mitigation measures, FAO has conducted a 
number of studies with national authorities in the 
1. Introduction
2 In the rest of the document, the “EVD outbreak” refers to the epidemio-
logical context as a whole, including health, economic, social and political 
dimensions.
3 Excepting Mali, the neighbouring countries of the three most affected 
countries had temporarily sealed their borders, but the porosity of borders 
remained an issue (World Bank, 2014b), (UNDP, 2015).
2three most affected countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone 
and Liberia): rapid assessments of the food security 
situation in the context of the Ebola outbreak, crop 
and food security assessments (CFSAM) in collabora-
tion with WFP, a rapid qualitative risk assessment for 
agricultural products in Ebola-affected countries, a 
rapid qualitative risk assessment for meat from wild 
animals and related activities linked to the Zaire Ebola 
virus (EBOV) in human populations and a bushmeat 
value chain analysis in the EVD outbreak context.
In addition, with technical assistance from Cirad, 
FAO has conducted an assessment of how market 
chains of agricultural products essential for local live-
lihoods (rice, horticultural products, cassava, palm oil, 
domestic animal products and cocoa) were affected 
by the EVD outbreak in 2014. This assessment is 
based on secondary data, interviews and the out-
comes of a technical consultation meeting (Dakar, 
9-10 December 2014). This report presents the con-
clusions of the assessment and makes recommenda-
tions based on the findings. 
Using the outcomes of the technical consultation 
meeting and building on past studies conducted by 
FAO and others, the report presents an analysis of 
the impact of the EVD outbreak on selected market 
chains and some recommendations for restoring 
trade flows and ensuring the smooth functioning of 
markets while minimizing the risk of disease spread. 
After the description of the methodology used for 
the analysis in section two, section three presents a 
detailed analysis for each market chain. Section four 
presents recommendations, and concluding remarks 
are made in section five. Additional information can 
be found in the annexes.
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3Many studies have now been conducted on the so-
cio-economic impacts of the EVD outbreak, including 
on markets and food security. The different meth-
odologies used, the specific angles addressed, the 
rapid evolution of data (a characteristic of any crisis) 
and their occasional contradictions make it difficult 
to have a clear overview of EVD-related impacts. The 
market-chain approach adopted in this document 
was jointly developed by FAO and Cirad based on 
the multidisciplinary market chain analysis approach-
es developed in Asia to understand the risk of the 
spread of infectious diseases such as Avian Influenza 
and to define control interventions at critical control 
points along market chains. It is an attempt to pro-
vide a detailed description of the impact of the EVD 
outbreak at the different stages of market chains. 
2.1 A market-chain approach
The proper functioning of market chains and flow 
of agricultural products are key elements for food 
and nutrition security. Communities are increasingly 
dependent on markets and their correct functioning 
for their food and nutrition security as revealed by 
several food security studies conducted in the three 
countries (WFP-CILSS-FEWS NET, 2010; WFP-Guinée, 
2010; WFP-Liberia, 2010). 
In order to have a better understanding of the mech-
anisms by which agricultural market chains and trade 
have been affected by the EVD outbreak, a mar-
ket-chain approach has been used. This approach 
proves particularly relevant and useful to coherently 
organize different sets of information on production, 
trade flows, restriction measures, markets and con-
sumer behaviours. The strategies developed by differ-
ent stakeholders in the market chains to mitigate the 
difficulties they face with the EVD outbreak are also 
considered in this market-chain approach. The rec-
ommended response options to address the various 
bottlenecks along market chains are based, in part, 
on the adaptation strategies reported from the field.
Seven market chains were selected based on their 
importance to regional food security, the risks as-
sociated with Ebola and the extent to which they 
were disrupted by the outbreak: rice, potatoes (as an 
example of horticultural products), cassava, palm oil, 
domestic animal products, bushmeat and cocoa.
For each market chain, we consider the impact of 
the entire epidemiological context, which refers to 
three main elements: the disease itself (and its im-
pact on health), the different restriction measures 
and people’s reactions to the epidemic (inhabitants 
who flee the affected areas, disruption of communi-
ty dynamics, or farmers, wage workers, consumers, 
transporters, traders, investors, etc. ceasing their ac-
tivities because of fear). Most of the EVD outbreak 
studies to date distinguish between the outbreak’s 
direct and indirect impacts on the socio-economic 
variables under consideration, and recognize that 
indirect pathways are mostly responsible for these 
socio-economic impacts (WFP, 2014e)4. However, 
the factors classified as direct or indirect vary from 
one study to another. For instance, the World Bank 
(2014b) distinguishes firstly “the direct and indirect 
effects of the sickness and mortality themselves, 
which consume healthcare resources and subtract 
people (…) from the labour force”; and secondly the 
behavioural effects resulting from the fear of conta-
gion that could motivate public actors or investors 
to take restriction measures. In a WFP document 
(2014e), indirect impacts are those stemming from 
official authorities’ restriction measures (closure of 
borders and markets, restriction of movements, etc.) 
and behavioural changes (fear, panic, rumour, etc.).
The impact of the entire epidemiological context has 
been analysed for each stage of the agricultural mar-
ket chains. These market chains have been disrupted 
at the production stage, e.g EVD incidence in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia is highest in these countries’ main 
cereal-producing areas. In 2014, farming activities 
were affected by a lack of manpower (many farming 
households were affected by the disease or quaran-
tined and labour availability was disrupted by public 
2. Methodology
4 As highlighted in the FAO-WFP CFSAM, “quantitatively, the direct impact in 
terms of the number people infected in relation to the size of the popula-
tion of the area is very small”.
4bans or self-imposed restrictions on group work). 
Downstream from production, market chains were 
disrupted by restrictions on the movement of goods 
and people as well as changes in demand (lack of 
purchasing power, shifts in consumption, etc.).
Baseline information describing agricultural market 
chains before the outbreak has been gathered when-
ever possible to compare it with the situation during 
the outbreak. Lessons learned from past experienc-
es with restriction measures have also been consid-
ered. Although most of the restriction measures are 
specific to the EVD outbreak (e.g. Ebola checkpoints 
to quarantine affected areas), some of them, such 
as the closure of borders, have already been imple-
mented for non-health reasons. For example, bans 
on agricultural exports were used in Guinea in 2007 
to contain the rise of food prices on domestic mar-
kets. These measures proved to be inefficient and 
may have counterproductive effects by encouraging 
market chain actors to bypass export bans, and lead 
to illegal flows and speculation. Moreover, gains for 
consumers are only short term as producers facing 
low selling prices are discouraged from producing 
and prices return to normal or even higher levels the 
following season.
However, it remains difficult to attribute clearly to 
the EVD outbreak any change at a given stage of the 
market chain. This is a well-known methodological 
limitation of any impact analysis, added to which is 
the difficulty of collecting and interpreting data (es-
pecially prices) in a context that is changing rapidly 
because of the EVD outbreak.
2.2 Data collection
The present document is partly based on an exten-
sive review of the literature covering impact studies 
of the EVD outbreak as well as food and nutrition 
security and market chain studies. One of the diffi-
culties when using secondary data is that methodo-
logical specifications are not systematically provided 
in the studies: for example, information about price 
types (producer or consumer prices), dates and lo-
cations of data collection, comparisons with previ-
ous years’ averages, etc. are sometimes missing. In 
particular, price variations during the Ebola outbreak 
need to be assessed against previous price patterns; 
this has not been always the case.
There are also gaps in data collection, especially at 
the household level (e.g. changes in food consump-
tion habits and expenditure on food items) because 
of the risks associated with conducting surveys at 
the peak of the outbreak. Lastly, collecting updat-
ed information on the different restrictions measures 
implemented in affected and non-affected countries 
has been difficult, especially through desk research. 
As noted by FEWS NET (2014a), these measures 
change frequently and precise information about the 
areas affected at a given time is limited. As a result, 
the information available is often contradictory.
The literature review was supplemented by thirty in-
terviews with stakeholders of selected market chains, 
researchers and experts in agricultural market chains 
and trade in West Africa (see list of interviewed per-
sons in Annex 7). The technical consultation meet-
ing organized in December 2014 in Dakar brought 
together around 50 stakeholders and specialists in 
food security, trade and agricultural market chains, 
experts in animal health, anthropology, epidemiolo-
gy, public health and health risks, as well as private 
sector actors (see presentation of the meeting and 
the list of participants in Annex 8).
2.3 Price interpretation
At the beginning of the crisis, increasing prices were 
regarded as an indicator of economic disruption and 
a threat to household food security. A rising price 
indicator may reflect supply deficits due to lower 
production (labour shortage, shortage of inputs in 
affected and production areas), lower food imports 
(lack of public resources) or increasing demand due, 
for example, to the stockpilling of strategic stocks 
by households or other stakeholders. However, price 
increases as an indicator may be misleading for dif-
ferent reasons.
Price variations must be interpreted in the context of 
seasonal and geographical patterns. In the affected 
countries, during a “normal” year, prices vary greatly 
across time (post-harvest season, lean season) and 
space (areas of production versus consumption). 
Moreover, in addition to these structural factors, other 
factors, independent of the Ebola outbreak, may 
affect agricultural prices such as climate conditions. 
On this last point, however, the three countries nor-
mally enjoy abundant and regular rainfall and do not 
suffer from drought like countries in the neighboring 
Sahel region. Weather conditions were within normal 
range in 2014, aside from some heavy rains in the 
north of Sierra Leone in early September 2014. 
5Introduction
This section presents the analysis of the impact of the 
EVD outbreak for each of the seven selected market 
chains: rice, cassava, potatoes (as an example of 
horticultural products), palm oil, domestic animal 
products, bushmeat and cocoa. As mentioned in 
the methodology section, these market chains were 
 
 
selected based on their importance to regional food 
security, the risks associated with Ebola and the 
extent to which they were disrupted by the outbreak 
itself. Attention was also given to their significance 
for regional trade (see Table 1). 
3. Market chains
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6Table 1. Main regional trade flows of agricultural products
From:
Guinea Sierra Leone Liberia Others
To: 
Guinea Palm oil
Cassava
Parboiled rice
Palm oil
cassava
Livestock from Mali
Fish from Senegal
Feed from Senegal 
and Côte d’Ivoire  
Sierra Leone Livestock Re-exports of imported 
rice
Livestock (seasonal)
Liberia Pork and poultry Imported rice from 
Côte d’Ivoire
Feed from Côte 
d’Ivoire
others Potatoes and other 
horticultural products 
to Senegal
Red palm oil and 
fonio to neighbouring 
countries
Map 2. Main regional trade flows of agricultural products
Source : FAO     
Guinea	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countries  
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7Rice is of significant socio-economic importance in 
the three affected countries; it plays a determining 
role for food security and represents a significant 
share of economic activity (marketing, processing, 
transport, importation, etc.). Rice is the main staple 
in the three countries but the level of local rice pro-
duction and the types of rice consumed are different. 
In all three countries, rice production is based largely 
on a labour-intensive, rain-fed system requiring vil-
lagers’ collective work for certain crucial production 
stages (sowing, maintenance, harvest, etc.)
Imported rice is strongly present in all three countries, 
even Guinea, which is one of the largest rice produc-
ing countries in West Africa. Over the 2009-2013 pe-
riod, more than 1.7 million tonnes of paddy rice on 
average were produced annually in Guinea, covering 
around 80 percent of domestic consumption, while 
the remaining 20 percent (around 250 000 tonnes 
of rice - milled equivalent) was  imported to supple-
ment local production (FAOSTAT 2014); (ATP, 2012); 
(UNDP, 2014). ‘Country rice’ (a parboiled rice made 
from locally-produced paddy) is more expensive than 
imported rice (white rice) but preferred by Guineans 
(ATP, 2012)6. In Liberia, imported rice is by far the 
most consumed rice with around two-thirds of do-
mestic needs covered by rice imports (WFP-Liberia, 
2010); (WFP-Liberia, 2011)7. Import dependency is 
far lower in Sierra Leone where local production of 
paddy rice has increased significantly over recent 
years, accounting for over one million tonnes per 
year on average over the last five years (FAOSTAT). 
Rice imports are mainly from the international mar-
ket but regional trade flows are not negligible. Sierra 
Leone in particular exports substantial quantities of 
local parboiled rice to Guinea.
The local and imported rice market chains have very 
different socio-economic characteristics: the local 
market chain provides a livelihood for millions of 
small-scale farmers and other actors8 whereas the 
imported rice market chain is highly concentrated9 
and provides accessible rice for millions of consum-
ers. Therefore, any disruption in rice production and 
(both local and international) trade flows due to the 
EVD crisis may have negative impacts on food securi-
ty and the socio-economic situation in general.
The EVD outbreak’s impact on the rice market chain 
is related to production and trade disruption and not 
to the product itself. The rapid qualitative risk assess-
ment (see Annex 2) concludes that imported rice has 
a negligible risk (i.e. so rare it can be excluded) of 
being contaminated with Ebola. For local rice, the 
risk to human health through contamination of the 
Highlights
•	Local	rice	production	was	affected	by	the	EVD	
outbreak due to the difficulty of maintaining 
farmer groups for farm work but the decrease 
in production was contained at the national lev-
el (between four and 12 percent), with some 
regional disparities.
•	The	domestic	and	 regional	marketing	of	 local	
rice was disrupted owing to traders’ fears of 
colleting rice in affected areas, and by market 
and border closures.
 
•	Impacts	on	prices	varied	considerably	depend-
ing on the area and the type of price. No mas-
sive, generalized price hikes were observed but 
slight increases or decreases were reported, es-
pecially in producer prices.
•	It	is	recommended	that	farmers	are	encouraged	
to resume farmer group activity and that meas-
ures are taken to reopen key periodic markets 
including a series of health measures to reduce 
risk (communication, hygiene kits, cleaning of 
infrastructure, etc.).
5 Thanks to Frédéric Lançon (Cirad) for his contribution
6 According to ATP (2012) country rice is sold at around a 50 percent 
mark-up with respect to imported rice.
7 Production of paddy rice in Liberia was less than 300 000 tonnes per 
year on average over the 2009-2013 period and imports of milled rice 
equivalent were around 200 000 tonnes per year on average over the 
2006-2011 period (FAOSTAT).
8 408 000 farming households in Liberia (WFP-Liberia, 2010).
9 A handful of companies (mainly Lebanese traders) control the rice import 
business: only seven companies are involved in importing rice in Liberia, 
with one of them accounting for 70 percent of total rice imports (WFP- 
Liberia, 2010); six firms are said to account for 90 percent of rice imports 
in Sierra Leone (WFP-CILSS-FEWS NET, 2010).
3.1 Rice5
810 Forested Guinea produces 38 percent of the national rice production 
while Maritime Guinea counts for 27 percent of total production  
(WFP-Guinée, 2010).
11 The FAO-WFP CFSAM (2014) estimates the Guinean rice production 
(milled rice equivalent) to be 1.3 million tonnes in 2014, a decrease  
from 2013 levels.
product after contact with an infected person, in-
fected meat or contaminated equipment is also very 
low, particularly in comparison to the risk of contam-
ination between market-chain actors.
Limited decline in national rice production 
despite labour shortages
As the 2014 rice-harvesting season progressed, 
crop production estimates were fine-tuned and the 
expected decline in production was revised and ap-
pears relatively limited (FAO-WFP CFSAM for each of 
the three countries).
Previous pessimistic forecasts for rice production 
were backed up by the fact that the rice producing 
areas in Guinea and Sierra Leone were also those 
most affected by the EVD outbreak. Forested Guinea 
is the main rice-producing area in Guinea (far ahead 
of Maritime Guinea10, another major production 
area), and was also the starting point of the epidem-
ic’s spread in the country and beyond to Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s main rice-producing ar-
eas are Kalangba, Makeni and Pujehun, - Kalangba 
and Makeni were severely affected by EVD, although 
to a lesser extent than Kailahun near Forested Guin-
ea. In Liberia, the county of Lofa, the main food-pro-
duction area,  in the north west of the country near 
the Gueckédou prefecture – is also one of the areas 
most affected by the outbreak (World Bank, 2014a).
In addition, the outbreak erupted and spread at a 
crucial period for the rice-farming season (see crop 
calendar, Annex 5), during the period normally dedi-
cated to land preparation, crop maintenance (weed-
ing, fencing, application of chemicals, etc.) and 
harvesting (FAO-WFP Rapid assessments, FAO-WFP 
CFSAM). For example, the Gueckédou prefecture 
reported that the outbreak began when land prepa-
ration was about to start (AGP, 2014). The outbreak 
peak of August and September 2014 occurred just 
before the harvest period in Guinea (FARM, 2014).
A decrease in rice production was therefore expect-
ed in 2014 compared with past farming seasons. At 
the start of the season, early estimations of rice pro-
duction were relatively positive because of favoura-
ble weather conditions. Data collected through the 
FAO-WFP Rapid assessments and Crop and Food Se-
curity Assessment Missions (CFSAM) showed a slight 
decrease at the national level. The figures were nev-
ertheless higher in rice-producing areas particularly 
affected by the EVD outbreak (see Table 2). In Guin-
ea, lower production was expected in 36 affected 
prefectures of the 47 surveyed (FAO-PAM-Guinée, 
2014) and a reduction of 3.7 percent  was estimated 
at the national level while an 8 percent  decrease was 
estimated in N’Zérékoré (FAO-WFP-Guinea, 2014)11. 
The rapid assessment in Sierra Leone indicated that 
60 percent of those interviewed expected a reduc-
tion compared with 2013 and the CFSAM estimation 
confirmed a reduction of 8 percent at the nation-
al level. In Liberia, rice production was expected to 
decrease, with estimations varying from ten to 15 
percent in general and up to 25 percent in the worst 
affected districts (FAO-WFP-Liberia, 2014a), which is 
consistent with CFSAM’s estimation of a 12 percent 
reduction (FAO & WFP, 2014c).
Table 2. Figures of rice production decreases due to EVD
Impact of EVD on rice production 
Decrease in % compared with estimates without EVD
Rice
Liberia 11.6%
County with highest impact: Lofa 20%
Sierra Leone 8%
County with highest impact: Kailahun 17%
Guinea 3.7%
County with highest impact: Nzerekore 8.4%
Source: FAO-WFP CFSAM for each country.
9The World Bank’s update on the EVD outbreak’s eco-
nomic impact on the three most affected countries 
is in line with FAO-WFP figures: “the impact on agri-
culture may not be as serious as earlier thought (…) 
government advice against congregating in large 
groups may have affected shared farm labour, reduc-
ing the size of groups from up to 50 to below ten 
people, with an estimated effect on the rice harvest 
of up to about 25 percent” (Bank, 2014c). World 
Bank mobile phone surveys also showed that farm 
abandonment was not as widespread as previously 
feared and those who had abandoned farms were 
returning to their land to farm (Bank, 2014c).
EVD’s negative impact on rice production was mainly 
due to labour shortages. Fear of contamination and/
or restrictions on gatherings affected collective farm-
ing activities in all three countries. The use of family 
labour instead of community teams hampered farm 
work and resulted in lower yields. In Gueckédou 
prefecture, farmers’ migration to safer areas often 
prevented mutual-assistance groups from working 
(AGP, 2014). In Sierra Leone, farmers expressed fear 
of meeting or even sharing tools, and a result they 
missed some crucial stages  in the planting season 
(World Bank, 2014a). In Liberia, the ‘kuu system’ was 
disrupted by quarantine measures and restriction on 
group work in the most affected counties (Bomi, 
Bong, Lofa and Margibi, Nimba). Almost all rapid as-
sessment and key informants forecast a reduction in 
yields because of the limited maintenance of fields 
(weeding and fencing) though no problems were 
reported for rice planting this season (FAO-WFP- 
Liberia, 2014a).
The relatively limited decrease in rice production at 
the national level may be explained by the fact that 
the planting season was less strongly disrupted (FAO-
WFP CFSAM). In Liberia, for instance, it was pointed 
out that the more labour-intensive land preparation 
and planting activities had already been completed 
through the ‘kuu system’ when the outbreak and 
public awareness reached a peak in August (FAO & 
WFP, 2014c). The use of family labour – while less 
efficient than mutual-assistance groups – also seems 
to be a key factor in mitigating the risk of a strong 
fall in production. As a result, the impact of EVD on 
the local rice market chain was mostly felt at the 
marketing level.
At the time this document was written, it remained 
uncertain what the outcome would be for the 2015 
production. Since new cases of Ebola were decreas-
ing, it was likely that the next season would be fairly 
favourable.
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Map 3. Local rice trade flows before the EVD outbreak
Source: FAO, based on FEWS NET, CILSS & ACF (2013); WFP-Sierra Leone (2011); FEWS NET, CILSS & WFP (2010).
Marketing of local rice strongly disrupted
The impact on the local rice trade was due to traders’ 
fears of collecting rice in Forested Guinea, restriction 
measures throughout the countries, and movement 
restrictions due to border controls at domestic and 
regional levels.
At the domestic level, the surpluses of rice pro-
duced in Forested Guinea are usually traded in ur-
ban markets in the region (N’Zérékoré, Macenta, 
Gueckédou) as well as outside the region in Labe, 
Kankan and Siguiri (Upper Guinea) and Conakry (see 
Map 3). Much of the surplus rice is produced on the 
coast (Boffa, Forécariah) (ATP, 2012); (FAO-PAM-
Guinée, 2014). In Sierra Leone (see Map 3), domes-
tic trade flows of local rice surpluses usually go from 
the producing areas (Kalangba, Pujehun and Mak-
eni) to deficit regions in the north and urban centres 
(WFP-Sierra Leone CFSVA 2010).
At the regional level, trade flow volumes of rice are 
far lower than those of domestically-traded rice 
surpluses. However, there is an emerging regional 
market with exports of parboiled rice from Sierra 
Leone to Guinea (see Map 3). Urbanization, rising 
prices since 2008 and a strong preference for local 
parboiled rice of the type produced in nearby Sierra 
Leone are driving an intensifying cross-border trade 
in this commodity (WFP-CILSS-FEWS NET, 2010). In 
particular, Guinean traders usually come to the large 
weekly market of Barmoi (Barmoi Luma International 
Market) in the district of Kambia to buy local rice and 
sell it in Guinea’s capital Conakry (interview).
Since the outbreak, at the domestic level, it was ob-
served that fewer collectors and wholesalers were 
entering EVD-affected areas in the Forested region 
in Guinea. The reduced number of collectors and 
wholesalers decreased the bargaining power of pro-
ducers, who were forced to sell at lower prices than 
expected. In Sierra Leone, the restriction measures, 
especially on transport (reduced number of trucks 
entering and leaving certain districts of Sierra Leone) 
and marketplaces (closure of ‘lumas’ -weekly markets), 
inevitably affected normal trade flows (see Map 4).
11
Map 4. Local rice trade flows during the EVD outbreak
Source: FAO, based on FEWS NET, CILSS & ACF (2013); WFP-Sierra Leone (2011); FEWS NET, CILSS & WFP (2010), FAO Technical Consultation Meeting. 
Note: the dotted arrows represent regional trade flows disrupted by the border closure.
The Ebola-related measures of border closures 
between affected countries also disrupted region-
al trade dynamics (see Map 4). According to the 
FAO rapid assessment in Sierra Leone, because of 
movement restrictions and market closures, rice 
producers and traders in Kambia and Port Loko 
districts faced physical constraints to reach markets 
in Guinea and Freetown. This resulted in the possi-
ble loss of contracts for producers as well as loss of 
income and reduced activity for most agribusinesses 
(FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014a).
There are also cross-border flows of imported rice 
(see Map 5), especially when the exchange rate 
makes imports from neighbouring countries more 
profitable than from the international market. For 
example, due to poor road connections with Mon-
rovia, trade flows of imported rice have been ob-
served from Côte d’Ivoire to chronically food-in-
secure south eastern Liberia. The remote Pujehun 
district of south-eastern Sierra Leone also acquired 
imported rice from Liberia through the Bo-Water-
side market (Grand Cape Mount county) because it 
was the cheapest source of imported rice. Imported 
rice re-exported from Guinea was found in the 
Liberian markets of Saclepea (Nimba county) and 
Gbarnga (Bong county) in late 2009, when the val-
ue of the Guinean franc against the Liberian dollar 
had eroded to the point of making such re-exports 
to Liberia profitable (WFP-CILSS-FEWS NET, 2010).
Initial concerns about volumes of imported rice in 
Liberia following the EVD outbreak (rerouting of 
shipping lanes, doubts over Liberia’s financial ca-
pacity to buy an increasing volume of imported rice) 
had receded by early 2015. The Liberian govern-
ment negotiated with importers to ensure sufficient 
volumes of imported rice but this capacity to mit-
igate the risk of Ebola impacts on rice availability 
proved costly (The Guardian, 26 Sept. 2014). During 
the EVD outbreak, concerns were raised that 
transporters (freighters, shippers) may decide that 
it was no longer worth the risk to work in Ebola- 
affected countries, but this never materialized as a 
critical issue. Had this been the case, some ports 
in the region could have prevented access to boats 
that had made a stopover in Conakry, Freetown 
or Monrovia, with imported rice transhipped on 
12
Map 5. Imported rice trade flows
Source: FAO, based on FEWS NET (2014b).
coasters, thus increasing the cost of transport. If a 
transporter were to be infected with Ebola, the direct 
result would probably have been an immediate de-
crease in importation.
Slight increases (or decreases) in prices 
but no general price hikes
The impacts of the EVD outbreak on rice production 
and marketing activities because of fear and restric-
tion measures affected the rice supply. Demand was 
also affected by the lack of customers at markets 
because of travel restrictions and decreasing pur-
chasing power in all three countries. Both supply and 
demand elements had repercussions on rice price 
trends. However, other variables such as the type 
of rice (local/imported), price (producer/retail), area 
(severely/less affected by EVD, locally or externally 
supplied) and levels of traders’ stocks also caused 
prices to vary considerably12.
Areas that relied on external suppliers, sometimes suf-
fered from inconsistent supply leading to an increase 
in prices. This was reported for the county of Bong 
in Liberia for instance, which was strongly affected 
by EVD and related restriction measures (FAO-WFP- 
Liberia, 2014a). In urban centres in Sierra Leone, the 
rapid assessment (FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014a) showed 
that the prices of most commodities including rice 
(wholesale price for rice bag and retail price for rice 
cup) increased. In Guinea, some areas not affected by 
EVD but relying on local rice from Forested Guinea 
(e.g. prefectures of Kissidougou, Kerouané, Forécari-
ah) saw an increase in local rice prices when traders’ 
stocks were not sufficient (FAO-PAM-Guinée, 2014).
However, decreases in local rice prices were observed 
in other Guinean areas, especially in the rice-produc-
ing region of Forested Guinea (e.g. prefectures of 
Macenta, Gueckédou, N’Zérékoré) – although very 
localized increases may have occurred within these 
areas due to the temporary market closures (FAO-
PAM-Guinée, 2014). In N’Zérékoré for instance, the 
12 It should be noted that price data are somewhat difficult to interpret 
because prices are highly volatile and previous years’ averages are not 
systematically compared in the different studies (see the methodology 
section).
13
price of local rice was 32.3 percent lower than the 
average of the previous five years, while the price was 
16.3 percent higher in Labé compared with the aver-
age of the previous five years.
In Sierra Leone, it was reported that owing to the 
closure of the large Kambia market (Barmoi Luma in-
ternational market), local rice was no longer being 
exported to Guinea and its price had decreased. The 
local rice normally sold at 250 000 Leones for a 50kg 
bag and was currently being sold at 200 000 Leones 
(interview). Weak demand also led to drops in sales 
and falling local rice prices at farm-gate level. This is-
sue was raised by the Kabala Women Vegetable Co-
operatives Society (FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014a).
Similarly, in the county of Lofa in Liberia, where a 
large amount of rice is produced, the number of cus-
tomers also decreased significantly(FAO-WFP-Liberia, 
2014a). It was reported by the NGO Concern (2014) 
that fewer traders were coming to the Thursday mar-
ket in Zorzor, and sales dropped as a result.
For imported rice, slight increases in prices were 
reported in some Ebola-affected areas13. This is the 
case of broken rice in Bomi county in Liberia (the larg-
est market for imported broken rice) and imported 
parboiled rice, especially in Lofa county (FAO-WFP- 
Liberia, 2014a); (WFP, 2014c [sept]). Nevertheless, the 
price is generally not very high in Liberia and prices 
were stable for imported rice prices in Guinea. In 
Sierra Leone, IGC (2014a) noted that prices did not 
rise much compared with 2012 prices in all areas, 
suggesting that transport issues and traders’ fear of 
infection did significantly disrupted the flow of im-
ported rice to markets. The number of traders for im-
ported rice is relatively constant between 2012 and 
2014 in both EVD-affected districts and non-affected 
districts. The FAO rapid assessment in Sierra Leone 
confirmed the slight price increase for imported rice. 
It was specified that in normal times, farmers would 
have started early harvesting, which helps to reduce 
the price of imported rice on the market.
13 According to FAO-WFP-Liberia (2014a), these slight increases “can also 
partially be attributed to the depreciation of the exchange rate between 
the Liberian Dollar and the US Dollar”.
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New areas faced with food insecurity  
vulnerability
Little information is available on food consumption 
changes due to the impact of EVD on food market 
chains and food prices.
However, in EVD-affected areas, incomes from the 
production and trade of local rice fell with the de-
crease in local rice prices (FAO-PAM-Guinée, 2014) 
and rice producers’ and traders’ livelihoods were af-
fected. Consumers may have benefit from cheaper 
rice in some cases, e.g. when the fall in producer 
prices was passed on to retail prices. However, the 
scarcity of customers at markets and price increas-
es for imported rice (and other basic commodities) 
suggest instead that they faced a significant drop in 
purchasing power.
The EVD outbreak affected rice-producing areas that 
are not usually among the most food insecure areas, 
apart from Forested Guinea. The N’Zérékoré area 
in Forested Guinea, which covers the Gueckédou 
prefecture where the outbreak originated, is one of 
Guinea’s regions most affected by chronic food inse-
curity with over 50 percent of inhabitants being food 
insecure (WFP-Guinée, 2010). The region has turned 
to mining activities at the expense of agricultural 
production, making communities more depend-
ent on the market for their food security (Ministry 
of Agriculture, 2014). WFP (2014e) shows that the 
worst-affected areas were relatively food secure prior 
to the EVD outbreak. By contrast, many of the areas 
less affected by EVD were highly food insecure be-
fore the crisis (WFP, 2014e). Therefore, the outbreak 
led to economic difficulties, and possibly food inse-
curity, for communities who are generally less vulner-
able. These newly-vulnerable communities may be 
more resilient to the degradation of their livelihoods 
than chronically food insecure communities. Being 
wealthier, they may have more assets to mitigate the 
consequences of the EVD outbreak. However this 
needs to be confirmed by in-depth household food 
security surveys. 
Some changes in consumption, such as substitut-
ing rice with other commodities, were observed as 
adaptation strategies due to decreasing purchasing 
power. Cassava is usually a substitute for rice in the 
three countries, although to a lesser extent in Libe-
ria where cassava is associated with the lean sea-
son and rice demand is less closely linked to price 
increases (interviews). Concern (2014) notes that in 
Lofa county, Liberia, people were gradually diversi-
fying their diets. For instance in Zogboyeata (Zorzor) 
cowpeas and plantains were being considered as an 
alternative to rice. In Guinea, particularly in Forested 
Guinea, the FAO-WFP rapid assessment concluded 
that the outbreak had led to growing food insecurity 
in EVD-affected areas: household food consumption 
had fallen for 90 percent of the communities sur-
veyed in EVD-affected areas. The consumption of 
imported rice had fallen dramatically and in some 
non-rice producing regions, rice had been replaced 
by maize and tubers (FAO-PAM-Guinée, 2014).
Conclusions and recommendations
The impacts of EVD on local rice market chains were 
mainly due to the difficulty of maintaining farmers 
groups for farm work and marketing rice at domes-
tic and regional levels. Two main recommendations 
have been made to address these difficulties:
•	 Encourage farmers to resume labour groups’ 
farming activities  
 In areas where EVD prevalence is high and col-
lective work has been disrupted with negative 
consequences on production levels, a nationwide 
campaign built on simple but reassuring mes-
sages is recommended to encourage farmers to 
resume labour groups. Information campaigns 
should be complemented by increased access to 
rural hygiene kits (so far focused on urban areas) 
and the active participation of local actors (village 
chiefs, farmer leaders, etc.).
•	 Accompany the re-opening of key periodic 
markets with health measures
 It is recommended that key periodic markets 
should be re-opened, especially in districts where 
EVD transmission has drastically reduced or is 
showing signs of decreasing. This re-opening 
should rely on intensive communication activities 
and information for the different stakeholders 
using the marketplace as well as the distribution 
of hygiene kits. Moreover these marketplaces 
should be closed at night and disinfected once a 
week. 
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The potato14 market chain in Guinea is known as a 
very dynamic market chain promoted by the dynam-
ic Federation of Producers of Fouta Djallon (FPFD). 
This market chain provides jobs and livelihoods for 
thousands of people, both in production and con-
sumption areas in Guinea and abroad (e.g. Conakry, 
Freetown, Monrovia, Bissau and Dakar). The actors 
involved in the potato market chain include produc-
ers, agricultural workers, input traders, transporters, 
retailers and other service providers (FPFD Memoran-
dum).
Around 20 000 tonnes of potatoes and several other 
thousand tonnes of fruits and vegetables (e.g. cab-
bages, carrots, tomatoes, eggplants) are produced 
each year in Mamou and Labe in Middle Guinea, 
around half of which are exported  mainly to Senegal, 
and also to Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. 
The potato market chain and the FPFD have encoun-
tered significant difficulties in the past because of 
governmental decisions to close borders. In response 
to a general strike, the Guinean authorities decided 
in January 2007 to ban the exportation of certain 
food products (including potatoes) in order to exert 
downward pressure on food prices on domestic mar-
kets. Because the domestic market was not able to 
absorb production surpluses, this resulted in a dra-
matic drop in producer and retail prices, and signif-
icant post-harvest and financial losses for traders 
(because of poor storage conditions). In addition, 
the Federation suffered significant financial losses, 
estimated at around 4.4 billion FNG, due to the non- 
reimbursement of input loans and bank charges. 
While consumers benefited from cheaper potatoes 
in the short term, the difficulties faced by producers 
and the Federation had negative repercussions on 
subsequent farming seasons leading to an increase 
in the price of potatoes (Le Coz-Broutin, 2009).
This section focuses on the potato market chain in 
Guinea because it clearly illustrates the consequenc-
es of border closure on market chain dynamics. How-
ever, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, vegetable market 
chains have also been affected by restriction meas-
ures. In Liberia, most vegetable production for sale 
takes place in the counties most affected by the EVD 
outbreak (e.g. Lofa, Margibi, Bomi, Bong, and Nimba) 
as they are well-connected to Monrovia. Because of 
road blockades, sale prices dropped, resulting in loss 
of income (FAO-WFP-Liberia, 2014).
In Sierra Leone, vegetable producers were hard hit 
by restriction measures in Koinadugu district (north-
ern region), especially by the drastic reduction in the 
number of trucks leaving the district (from ten to five) 
and the frequency of weekly transport (from 2-3 to 
2), (FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014b). This led to spoilage of 
vegetables on the farm, post-harvest losses and low-
er prices for the small quantity of vegetables leaving 
the district. Representatives from the Kabala Wom-
en Vegetable Cooperatives Society reported that 
the Freetown market was no longer accessible, and 
this led farmers to sell their vegetables at the local 
market in Kabala town (FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014a). 
In local markets, more vegetables were available as 
consumers purchased less, leading to a glut in these 
markets, and farmers are therefore forced to sell at 
very low prices. Moreover, because production activ-
Highlights
•	The	 five-month	 Senegal	 border	 closure	 from	
August 2014 to January 2015 forced Guinean 
producers and traders to halt their exports of 
horticultural products to Senegal, leading to 
huge post-harvest losses.
•	The	EVD-related	 restriction	measures	 led	 to	a	
dramatic fall in producer prices in the Fouta 
Djallon (2000 GNF/kg in August 2014 instead of 
 
 
more than 3000 GNF/kg usually), a region that 
was not been severely affected by the epidemic.
•	The	main	recommendation	when	borders	must	
be closed for health reasons is to consider es-
tablishing trade corridors allowing for a mini-
mum flow of agricultural goods and market- 
chain function.
14 Potatoes considered here are the Solanumtuberosum variety.
3.2 Potatoes (and other horticultural products)
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ities were maintained at higher costs (seed inputs are 
more expensive), farmers faced a reduction in profit-
ability. With this income loss, the risk was that fewer 
amounts of vegetables would be produced during 
the 2015 season (FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014b).
Guinean exports of potatoes to Senegal 
stopped by a five months border closure
On 26 January 2015, Senegal reopened its land 
border with Guinea after five months of closure15. 
On 3 September 2014, the government requested 
the closure of 16 weekly markets along its border 
with Guinea (WFP, 2014b), including the large re-
gional market of Diaobé, the main market outlet for 
Guinean potato exports. The border closure between 
Guinea and the other EVD-affected countries is also 
an important element since traders from these coun-
tries (especially Sierra Leone) usually come to Guinea 
to purchase potatoes from producers in Fouta Djallon 
or from wholesalers in Conakry (Le Coz-Broutin, 
2009) (see Map 6).
The perishable nature of potatoes is a strong con-
straint for market-chain function when restriction 
measures such as border closure are imposed. This 
situation is the same for other, even more perishable 
horticultural products, (e.g. cabbage) exported from 
Guinea, especially from the Fouta Djallon region. 
The impact of the EVD-related restriction measures 
on horticultural market chains in Fouta Djallon was 
therefore far from negligible, although this region 
was not severely affected by EVD and the risk of con-
tamination through the product was negligible (see 
the qualitative risk assessment in Annex 2).
Significant post-harvest losses
The difficulty for producers and traders to sell sur-
pluses in neighbouring countries led to significant 
spoilage and post-harvest losses. The 2014 rainy 
season and inter-season were particularly favoura-
ble for production (estimated by the FPFD at 22 800 
15 After a first closure of its land border from 30 March to 6 May 2014, 
Senegal decided to close its land border again on 21 August 2014. The 
recent re-opening of the land border was preceded by the re-opening 
of air and maritime borders on 14 November 2014.
Map 6. Potato trade flows during the Senegal border closure
Source: FAO, based on FAO Technical Consultation Meeting.
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tonnes). Exceptionally large areas were planted, but 
potatoes that reached maturity were left to rot in 
fields or filling warehouses and were lost due to poor 
storage conditions (FPFD memorandum).
Drop in producer and retail prices
A significant drop in both producer and retail prices 
was observed in the region of Fouta Djallon in Au-
gust 2014 compared with the same period in 2013. 
According to the farmer federation, the average 
farm-gate price for potatoes did not exceed 2 000 
GNF/kg in August and early September 2014, while in 
2012 and 2013 August prices were 3 092 and 3 483 
GNF respectively. Meanwhile, the local retail price for 
potatoes dropped by 65 percent  between June and 
September 2014 on the market of Labé, a key mar-
ket in this region on the Guinea-Senegal trade route 
(WFP, 2014c [sept]). Price decreases have also been re-
ported in the Dalaba prefecture, especially in Dalaba 
and Pita (FAO-PAM-Guinée, 2014).
However, the FAO-WFP rapid assessment carried out 
in Guinea reported increases in potato prices com-
pared with the period before the outbreak in some 
non-producing prefectures: Dabola, Kissidougou, 
Kouroussa, Guéckédou and Forécariah. These price 
increases were possibly due to lower supply from 
Maritime Guinea (FAO-WFP-Guinea 2014).
Lower incomes for farmers and potential 
financial losses
According to the FPFD, because farmers were forced 
to sell at a loss or discard their products, production 
costs were not covered (although production costs 
in the rainy season and inter-season are typically far 
lower than during the dry season16).
The decrease in farmers’ incomes was likely to cause 
difficulties for loan repayments to purchase farm in-
puts for the following season and probably resulted 
in financial losses for the producer federations con-
cerned and their members. Selling at a loss also limits 
farmers’ ability to build food stocks and pay for ed-
ucation, health and schooling (FPFD memorandum). 
FPFD estimated post-harvest losses at around 45.6 
billion GNF (USD 6.5 million) and  UNDP (2014) esti-
mated income losses of approximately 0.6 percent of 
GDP for all potato market chain actors.
16 Renewed seeds and fewer inputs are used and there is no irrigation (Le 
Coz-Broutin, 2009).
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Conclusions and recommendations
The EVD-related restriction measures imposed by 
Senegal to avoid the spread of the virus domestically 
had dramatic consequences on the potato market 
chain in Fouta Djallon in Guinea, a region where 
case incidences have been minimal. All market-chain 
actors, especially producers, suffered from lower 
prices due to the halt of exports to Senegal while 
the domestic market proved insufficient to absorb 
production surpluses. As a result, farmers and pro-
ducer federations faced financial losses with poten-
tial long-term effects beyond the 2014 season. The 
EVD’s negative impacts on the potato market chain 
were likely to be similar in other horticultural market 
chains that faced the same constraint of products’ 
perishable nature. Vegetable spoilage as a result of 
restriction measures (e.g. reduction in the number 
and frequency of trucks in Sierra Leone) and insuf-
ficient demand from urban areas also led to lower 
prices and income reduction in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Similarly, the closure of border and weekly regional 
markets had repercussions in Senegal. The availabili-
ty of fruits and vegetables from Guinea was reduced 
for Senegalese consumers. In particular, access to 
food became more difficult for vulnerable communi-
ties living in the south (Kolda, Kédougou, Sédhiou).
Some alternatives to the closure of the border and 
weekly markets in Senegal were implemented by 
Guinean market chain actors but none of them ap-
peared entirely satisfactory (interview). The bypass 
via Mali – which did not close its border with Guinea 
– in order to continue exports to Senegal - consider-
ably increased the length (at the expense of product 
quality) and costs of transport. Developing exports to 
Mali instead of exporting to Senegal would involve 
establishing trader networks, building trust for ad-
ditional volumes of exports, etc. The transshipment 
of potatoes at the Senegal-Guinea border directly 
on the ground leads to the deterioration of products 
and increases transport costs (return-rates on both 
sides of the border). In areas of Fouta Djallon where 
this is possible, FPFD advised its members to post-
pone harvesting in the hope of higher prices and the 
reopening of borders.
Organizing trade corridors is therefore an option to 
be considered when borders are closed for health 
reasons. The re-opening of the Senegal-Guinea 
border should also be accompanied by appropriate 
health controls for sanitary trade corridors. The pro-
tocol for organizing such corridors should make use 
of WHO recommendations in the document “Ebola 
Event Management at Points of Entry: Interim guid-
ance” (WHO, Sept. 2014), adapted for the transport 
of agricultural products. For instance, a specific area 
around the border posts on either side of the border 
could be dedicated to health checks on drivers and 
possibly commodities by relevant officials (health and 
agriculture officials in charge of phytosanitary checks) 
before the usual customs controls. Clear instructions 
should also be given to law enforcers, particularly at 
checkpoints, instructing them to give priority to the 
movement of food and commodities. In some cas-
es, transporters prefer to transport perishable goods 
(e.g. vegetables) at night when the weather is cool-
er. These traders should not be restricted to daylight 
movement of goods.
Furthermore, support measures for producers and 
the Federation of Producers of Fouta Djallon ap-
peared necessary to counter the financial losses sus-
tained from significant post-harvest losses and steep 
price drops in potato prices. Financial assistance for 
reimbursing loans for inputs, subsidising inputs for 
the following farming season and procuring local 
food for food distribution schemes were some of the 
measures proposed by the Federation to support the 
potato sector (interview).
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Cassava is the second most important staple food 
and a common substitute for rice in the three affect-
ed countries. It is widely produced in each of these 
countries. The main areas of production in Sierra 
Leone are in Pujehun district. In Guinea, the major 
producing areas are in Coastal Guinea, South-east-
ern Guinea, and Upper Guinea but surpluses are 
produced in Maritime Guinea, Forested Guinea and 
Upper Guinea while the major deficits areas are in 
the north of Middle Guinea and Upper Guinea and 
in and around Conakry (FEWS NET, 2013).
Major domestic trade flows in Guinea move from the 
southeast to the northeast (Beyla-Kankan) and west-
ern parts of the country (Nzérékoré-Kissidougou- 
Mamou-Conakry or Labé); minor flows supply the 
northern part of the country (Boké-Gaoual, Mamou-
Labé, Faranah-Dinguiraye and Kankan-Siguiri). Din-
guiraye is an important market for cassava. During 
the harvest season, traders bring large quantities 
of cassava to Dinguiraye where cassava tubers are 
processed into cassava flour and gari. During the 
lean season and the period leading up to Ramadan, 
processed cassava flows to the major urban markets 
of Guinea (Conakry, Kankan, etc.) as well as to Mali 
(FEWS NET, 2013). In Sierra Leone, the Barmoi mar-
ket in Kambia is an important market for cassava 
because traders from Kenema and Kailahun come 
there to sell gari to and buy palm oil (FEWS NET, 
CILSS & WFP, 2010).
In addition, Sierra Leone is emerging as an important 
supplier of cassava and gari in particular for Guinea 
and Liberia (see Map 7). More than 1 000 tonnes 
of gari per month are exported from Sierra Leone 
to Guinea. Sierra Leone is the principal provider of 
gari for the urban markets of Conakry and Monro-
via. Gari is a cheap food source and thus contributes 
to urban household’s food security in Monrovia and 
Conakry (FEWS NET, CILSS &WFP, 2010).
Regional trade corridors for cassava and gari stretch 
from Sierra Leone through Kambia (200 to 400 tonnes/
week) to Forecariah in Guinea and from Freetown to 
Conakry by canoe. Cross-border flows also exist from 
Jendema in southern Sierra Leone (600 bags/week) 
to Bo Waterside and Monrovia in Liberia (60 tonnes/
week according to the map below) (USAID, 2012).
Highlights
•	The	cassava	market	chain	was	not	severely	af-
fected by EVD-related restrictions on the move-
ment of goods because cassava is widely pro-
duced in the three most affected countries and 
is not perishable.
•	Labour	 shortages	 did	 not	 affect	 the	 cassava	
market chain as strongly as for other products 
such as rice because production is far less la-
bour intensive.
•	Border	 closure	 between	 affected	 countries	 is,	
however, likely to have disrupted the dynamic 
of regional trade flows of cassava and gari from 
Sierra Leone to the sub-region.
•	It	 is	 recommended	 that	 cross-border	 trade	
corridors are considered as an option to main-
tain agricultural trade flows when borders are 
closed for health reasons.
3.3 Cassava
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Map 7. Cross-border trade flows of gari
Source: FAO, based on FEWS NET, CILSS & WFP (2010).
Little impact on production
Cassava is harvested throughout the year (see crop 
calendar in Annex 5) in all three countries and differ-
ent studies (FAO-WFP rapid assessments, FAO-WFP 
CFSAM, FEWS NET) all concluded that there was no 
major issue with cassava production during the EVD 
outbreak (little impact according to the rapid assess-
ment in Liberia). Cassava is less labour-intensive than 
other crops such as rice and can remain in the soil until 
farmers are ready to harvest, allowing greater flexibility. 
The crop was therefore not significantly affected by 
the reduced availability of labour.
However, a reduction in activity was reported in pro-
cessing by the Lumpa Cassava Processing Growth 
Centre in Pujehun, the main cassava production dis-
trict in south east Sierra Leone. Because gatherings 
were discouraged, farmers who mainly harvest in 
groups faced difficulties harvesting, leading to a short-
age of raw materials for processors (FAO-Sierra Leone, 
2014b). In Guinea, the FAO-WFP rapid assessment 
shows that the cassava trade has been affected (trans-
port restrictions), leading to an increase in cassava 
stocks in Kerouane (prefecture in the Kankan region).
Similar prices or slight increases
In Sierra Leone, the FAO-WFP rapid assessment 
(2014a) showed a significant increase (+52 percent) 
in cassava prices in urban markets between March 
and August 2014. However, the same study reports 
that the price of cassava varies by a factor of one to 
four according to the district and there is no compar-
ison with averages from previous years. FAO Sierra 
Leone (2014b) reported difficulties for cassava pro-
cessors to access suppliers of raw cassava because 
of quarantine measures, restrictions on movement, 
checkpoints and curfews. This contributed to high-
er costs in procuring and processing cassava and led 
to lower volumes of processed cassava and price 
increases. Other studies reported normal prices or 
slight increases for cassava. In Kailahun and Kenema, 
there appeared to be a very slight increase in price 
compared with other parts of the country according 
to IGC (2014a), while the WFP mVAM17 in Septem-
ber 2014 reported normal prices. In Southern Prov-
17 The WFP is tracking food security during the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) 
outbreak by collecting data from households through short mobile 
phone surveys (mVAM surveys). http://vam.wfp.org/sites/mvam_moni-
toring/index.html
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ince, a surplus-producing area for the commodity, 
cassava flour prices are lowest (WFP mVAM-Sierra 
Leone, 2014).
In Liberia, significant increases have been observed 
over short-term periods: for example, cassava in-
creased by 30 to 150 percent within the first two 
weeks of August 2014 in Monrovia (FAO, 2014), 
(FEWS NET, 2014a). The WFP mVAM conducted in 
Liberia reported stable prices (WFPmVAM-Liberia, 
2014). At the regional level, the November 2014 
mVAM (WFPmVAM-regional, 2014) concluded that 
cassava prices were in line with usual patterns (sea-
sonal increase).
Higher consumption as a substitute for 
rice
The only observation gathered regarding cassava 
consumption is from the mVAM in Guinea which 
highlights the consumption of less-preferred food 
products, undoubtedly the  result of a substitution 
effect from rice to cassava (WFP mVAM Guinée, 
2014).
Conclusions and recommendations
The cassava market chain was not severely affected 
by the EVD outbreak. Several characteristics of this 
market chain can explain this limited impact. Firstly, 
the production of cassava is far less labour intensive 
than the rain-fed production system for rice, for ex-
ample. Labour shortages, restriction measures and 
fear behaviours therefore had far less impact on the 
production cycle. Secondly, cassava is widely pro-
duced throughout the three most affected countries 
and, unlike horticultural products, is not perishable. 
The EVD-related restrictions on the movement of 
goods have therefore had less impact on trade flows 
from production to consumption areas.
However, the border closure between affected coun-
tries has affected the dynamics of regional trade 
flows of cassava and gari, especially from Sierra Leo-
ne to the sub-region.
It is therefore recommended that cross-border trade 
corridors are considered as an option to maintain re-
gional cassava trade flows when borders are closed 
for health reasons. Similar to the recommendations 
concerning potatoes, the protocol for organizing 
such corridors should rely on WHO guidelines in 
the document “Ebola Event Management at Points 
of Entry: Interim guidance” (WHO, Sept. 2014), 
adapted to the transport of agricultural products. 
For instance, a specific area around the border posts 
on either side of the border could be dedicated to 
health checks on drivers and possibly commodities 
by relevant officials (health and agriculture officials 
in charge of phytosanitary checks) before the usual 
customs controls.
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An important cash and food crop for local 
livelihoods
Palm oil production, processing and trade represent 
attractive activities, accessible to the poorest house-
holds. They contribute to household food security 
as they require little investment and provide various 
types of work to unskilled workers. Moreover, palm 
oil, whether locally produced or imported -from Asia- 
represents a large part of urban and rural household 
food consumption (FEWS NET, 2014a; FEWS NET, 
CILSS, FAO, & WFP, 2010a; Rafflegeau, 2014).
The importance of palm oil in the area is illustrat-
ed by the following figures: in Liberia, 22 percent 
of households are involved in palm oil production; 
in Sierra Leone, palm oil ranks second or third as an 
income source in rural areas; and in Guinea, 80  per-
cent of palm oil production is artisanal with women 
playing a central role in processing and trade (FEWS 
NET et al., 2010a; Tailliez, 2007).
Palm oil trade is organized through three main mar-
ket chains (FEWS NET et al. (2010a); interview):
•	 Global	 export.	 The	 civil	 wars	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	
(1991-2002) and Liberia (1989-1996 and 2001-
2003) destroyed these countries’ infrastructure, 
including palm oil mills. In recent years, large 
companies have reinvested in these countries and 
today Liberia and Sierra Leone trade palm oil on 
international markets. Large companies operate 
in Guinea (in N’Zérékoré), Liberia (large compa-
nies have recently invested in oil palm planting, 
e.g. Sime Darby, one of the world largest produc-
ers of palm oil, Golden VerOleum and Sinar Mars) 
and Sierra Leone (Gold Tree, Socfin Agricultural 
Company), using land leases and sometimes fac-
ing resistance from local communities (e.g. in Pu-
jehun, Sierra Leone).
•	 Cross-border	 regional	 trade	 (see Map 8). Palm 
oil represents a significant cross-border trade in 
the area, with Sierra Leone emerging as a grow-
ing supplier for the Guinean market. Palm oil is 
traded from Sierra Leone (Barmoi market, near 
Kambia, handles approximately 30 000 litres of 
palm oil every week, two-thirds of which are trad-
ed to the markets of Madina and Bonfi in nearby 
Conakry) and Liberia (Ganta market – a whole-
sale and retail market - in Nimba County, handles 
90 000 litres of palm oil every week during 
the marketing season, of which 60 percent are 
exported to Guinea). Guinea exports and re- 
exports palm oil to Senegal through the Diaobé 
market- and to Gambia (FEWS NET et al., 2010a; 
Sy, 2002).
•	 Domestic	trade	involving	small-scale	stakeholders,	
mainly women, over small distances. Oil is sold on 
roadsides, and is rarely recorded for statistics and 
therefore probably largely under-estimated. A 
study conducted in Guinea in 2002 indicated that 
the majority of palm oil produced using artisanal 
Highlights
•	The	temporary	closure	of	industrial	plantations	
led to job losses and decreased purchasing 
power, but did not affect the international mar-
ket. The surge of foreign investment following 
years of civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia ex-
perienced a temporary slow-down.
•	Regional	trade	suffered	from	the	closure	of	bor-
der markets. Domestic trade was less affected 
but as a result of a reduced number of traders, 
farm-gates prices likely reduced as well. 
•	Consumer	prices	remained	relatively	stable	with	
some occasional increases of up to 30 percent 
in some capitals. 
•	Major	recommendations	are	to	re-open	region-
al markets, e.g. Ganta market in Sierra Leone 
and to support producers in affected areas to 
market their palm oil production themselves.
3.4 Palm oil18
18 Thanks to Sylvain Rafflegeau (Cirad) and Patrice Levang (IRD) for their 
contribution.
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methods (90 percent  of families visited) was sold 
locally in the village of production or at the week-
ly market if it could be reached without incurring 
transport expenses (Sy, 2002).
These three market chains involve different qualities 
of palm oil (industrial, artisanal and traditional). Palm 
oil can be stored but the quality decreases after four 
months (acidification).
Statistical data generally only takes industrial production 
into account. Considering this limitation, palm oil pro-
duction is estimated (in 2000, Index Mundi) at 50 000 
tonnes in Guinea (20th producer), 36 000 tonnes in 
Sierra Leone and 42 000 tonnes in Liberia (60 000 
tonnes in 2013; Oil World) (see Figure 1 and Table 3).
Table 3. Industrial palm oil production, import, export and consumption
Figure 1. Palm oil industrial production, kt
Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone
Prod., kt, 2000 (and rank)
Index Mundi
50 (21st) 42 (24th) 36 (36th)
Prod., kt 2013 (and rank) 
Oil world
n.a 60 (20th) n.a
Import, kt, 2013 (and rank)
Oil world
77 (63rd) n.a n.a
Export, kt, 2013 (and rank)
Oil world
n.a n.a 6 (41st)
Consumption*, kg/cap/an 
FAO 2013, Jannot 2014
6.4 15.2 11.5
*Including palmist oil 
(Source: Food balance sheet, FAO 2013; Jannot 2014)
(S. Rafflegeau based on Index Mundi)
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Map 8. Palm oil cross-border trade flows
Source: FAO, based on FEWS NET et al., 2010a; FEWS NET, CILSS, FAO, & WFP, 2010b; Jannot, 2014
Ebola impact limited by the organizational 
structure of the market chain
The qualitative risk assessment (see Annex 2) con-
cludes that the risk of palm oil being contaminat-
ed by the Ebola virus is negligible. Nevertheless, the 
palm oil market chain has been affected by EVD 
mainly through trade disruption.
Production was expected to be seriously affected by 
labour shortages and a 75 percent drop in produc-
tion was announced in affected areas in September 
2014 (World Bank, 2014). This dramatic figure may 
have been overestimated because it is limited to in-
dustrial plantations, where production has indeed 
decreased. In Liberia, industrial plantations (Sime 
Darby, Equatorial Palm Oil, Golden VerOleum Liberia) 
focused on plantation maintenance activities (EPO 
and GVL websites; World Bank [2014]). Sime Darby 
evacuated its managerial and supervisory personnel 
but continued to pay its 3 000 staff members in Libe-
ria (“as a means of promoting economic growth”19); 
the Equatorial Palm Oil (EPO) Company reduced its 
rate of new planting20.
The impact of this slowdown has limited impact on 
the international market as these countries’ palm oil 
production does not contribute significantly to inter-
national trade and because most of these plantations 
are quite new and not yet at full operational capacity. 
For small-scale producers, processors and traders, 
one major impact was related to the disruption of 
cross-border trade due to long periods of market 
closures (e.g. Ganta and Barmoi markets in Sierra 
Leone) and border closures. However, it appears that 
products including palm oil continued to circulate 
between Sierra Leone and Guinea (the border closure 
between these two countries was limited and prior 
to the epidemic, there was significant palm oil smug-
gling between Kambia district and Guinea [Jannot, 
2014]). It is likely that Sierra Leone’s growing role in 
supplying palm oil to  neighbouring countries has not 
ceased completely, although it has been negatively 
affected. One of the regional palm oil trade routes, 
19 http://www.agrimoney.com/news/africa-palm-oil-groups-acknowl-
edge-ebola-threat--7393.html
20 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/
market-news-detail/12138357.html
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from Côte d’Ivoire to Senegal through Guinea, was 
diverted via Mali (FEWS NET, 2014a). Short-distance 
domestic trade was probably less affected.
Significant price variations have been reported, com-
paring affected and non-affected areas, or pre-EVD 
outbreak and EVD outbreak periods, and have been 
attributed to the epidemic. However, some of these 
interpretations did not take into account usual geo-
graphical (producing and non-producing areas) and 
seasonal (harvest and lean seasons) price patterns.
Globally and as observed for other agricultural prod-
ucts, prices have been decreasing in production ar-
eas and increasing in consumption areas (cities). In 
Guinea, a higher price differential has been recorded 
between palm oil production areas (3 000 FG for half 
a litre of palm oil in Forested Guinea) and other re-
gions (3 600 FG, September 2014). In these regions, 
stocks were assessed to be lower compared to the 
same period in previous years (FAO-WFP-Guinea 
2014). However, increasing prices have been record-
ed in specific places including in production areas. 
These are isolated cases and probably linked to tem-
porary market closures. 
In Sierra Leone, a study conducted in August 2014 
by the International Growth Center (IGC) record-
ed similar palm oil prices in Kailahun and Kenema 
districts compared with other parts of the country. 
As palm oil is usually cheaper in the two districts 
than elsewhere, this represents a relative increase 
compared with past years (IGC, LSE, & University of 
Oxford, 2014). Major price increases were registered 
in capital cities (Monrovia, Freetown) - up to 30 per-
cent in Monrovia between July and August 2014 
(FEWS NET, 2014) and in Diaobe market (Senegal).
The relatively low increase in palm oil prices (except 
in capital cities) could be linked to market reorgan-
ization. According to some observers, palm oil pro-
duction that could not be traded on international 
or regional markets was diverted to national mar-
kets. This reorganization is due to the initiative of 
new economic stakeholders who invested in risky 
but potentially profitable trade activities. Trading in 
these areas represented a health and an economic 
risk (speculative risk), and was therefore not attrac-
tive or accessible to all the usual small-scale palm oil 
traders. Some of these new traders were involved in 
the cocoa or bushmeat trade before the Ebola crisis. 
Moreover, to cope with trader defections, farmers in 
affected areas sometimes organized their own mar-
keting system to supply deficit areas such as urban 
centres, using the social networks they were able to 
mobilize. There was, therefore, in some areas a re-
duction in the number of actors involved in palm oil 
trade and a negative impact on those with the least 
economic and social capital. The reduced number 
of traders affected producers’ bargaining power. In 
other areas, the return of many women previously 
involved in the bushmeat trade to the palm oil re-
tailing trade, and the local trading of oil previously 
traded on regional or international markets has led 
to a saturation of local markets.
Conclusions and recommendations
Trade restrictions reduced the income related to 
palm oil production, processing and trade for rural 
households, especially for poor households. The im-
pact was lower on palm oil than cocoa since it is not 
only exported but also consumed locally.
Cross-border trade was not totally interrupted but 
suffered from the closure of regional markets and in 
particular of the Ganta market. This contributed to 
slowing down Sierra Leone’s efforts in positioning it-
self as a growing supplier of palm oil (along with cas-
sava and rice) in the region. Domestic trade was less 
affected but as a consequence of a reduced number 
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of traders, prices paid to producers probably fell. Un-
fortunately, there is a shortage of data in this area 
(the prices most easily available are market prices).
In order to improve the assessment of the outbreak 
impact on the palm oil market chain, the diversity 
and interdependency of the market chains for this 
product should also be taken into account. Strate-
gies implemented by stakeholders or new stakehold-
ers entering the chain must also be considered. The 
impact on the trade of oil palm by-products (kernel 
oil) also needs to be assessed.
The major recommendation is to re-open regional 
markets such as Ganta market in Sierra Leone. This 
re-opening requires intensive communication activ-
ities and information on Ebola for and by the mar-
ket’s different stakeholders. These activities should 
focus on early detection and monitoring of new 
Ebola cases and disseminating hygiene practices 
that will also benefit other health threats. Moreover, 
marketplaces should be closed at night and once a 
week for disinfection. 
Another recommendation is to support producers in 
affected areas to market their palm oil production 
themselves.
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A significant contribution to local liveli-
hoods despite low production levels 
The area covered by the three main affected coun-
tries is not a major area for animal production or 
consumption compared with other West African 
countries such as Mali (and to a lesser extent Guinea) 
(see Box 1). Animal products include mainly small ru-
minants and backyard poultry, fish, bushmeat, and 
pork for non-Muslim communities (higher in Liberia 
than in the two others countries)21.
In Sierra Leone, in 2007, about 8.5 percent, 6.6 per-
cent and 1.5 percent of households in the country 
owned goats, sheep and cattle respectively22,23. In 
Liberia the percentages are respectively 8.9 percent, 
2.6 percent and 0.3 percent24. Cattle are more im-
portant in Guinea (with Central Guinea as the main 
area for livestock25) compared with the other coun-
tries. The proportion of households engaged in ani-
mal production activities is far higher when poultry is 
included: 92 percent of farming households are en-
gaged in livestock activities for both home consump-
tion and commercial purposes (FAO & WFP, 2014). 
Most cattle, sheep and goats and poultry graze in 
free-roaming flocks in villages and their environs.
Meat that is consumed (see Table 4) is mainly from 
livestock raised for home-consumption; in value, 
home-consumption accounts for 52 percent in Sierra 
Leone, 35 percent in Liberia and 17 percent in Guinea. 
Meat consumption is equivalent to around 6.5 kg/
cap/year in Sierra Leone in 2002, 7 kg in Liberia in 
2005 and 10 kg in Guinea in 2002. As a reference, 
to fight against malnutrition and under-nourishment, 
FAO recommends 20 g of animal protein per person 
per day or 7.3 kg per year. This can be achieved by 
an annual consumption of 33 kg lean meat or 45 
kg fish or 60 kg eggs or 230 kg milk, respectively.26 
However, these figures do not take into account fish 
and bushmeat consumption 
Highlights
•	Domestic	 animal	 products	 were	 affected	 by	
consumers’ decreased purchasing power and, 
for the commercial poultry sector, by difficul-
ties in accessing imported animal feed. 
•	Regional	trade	in	livestock	is	generally	limited.	
Nonetheless, the trade of animals from Mali 
via Guinea to Sierra Leone and Liberia was re-
duced. Similarly, the trade activity of livestock 
farmers in Forested Guinea to supply Liberia 
with pigs and poultry was hampered.
•	Animal	 restocking	 should	 be	 targeted	 where	
bushmeat consumption was replaced by con-
sumption of small livestock (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire) 
or where loss of income has caused farm de-
capitalization (affected areas). 
•	Current	and	future	projects	should	be	formu-
lated in light of the EVD experience to consid-
er substitution of bushmeat with other animal 
products and assure wildlife conservation. 
3.5 Domestic animal products 
21 Nearly 71 percent of total population are muslim in Sierra Leone, 84 
percent  in Guinea, 13 percent  in Liberia (Pew research center http://
features.pewforum.org/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF.pdf)
22 In Sierra Leone’s rural areas, the percentage of rural households rearing 
sheep (8.7 percent) and goats (11.3 percent) is higher than their urban 
counterparts (sheep, 5.1 percent ; goats, 3.6 percent ). Most of the 
animals are owned by households in the Northern Province, especially in 
Koinadugu, Kambia, Bombali and Port Loko districts.
23 http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Sierraleone/Sierraleone.
htm
24 Mainly Grand Gedeh, Maryland, Nimba, River Gee, Grand Kru and Bong. 
http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Liberia/liberia.htm
25 http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ilri/x5474e/x5474e09.htm
26 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/themes/en/meat/background.html
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“Liberia and Sierra Leone are not major 
livestock-rearing areas. Meat and milk con-
sumption are low in both countries. As such, 
demand for meat is largely satisfied through 
domestic sources for small ruminants and 
from the north - including Guinea and Mali 
- for cattle. Livestock supply increases in the 
rainy season due to household needs for cash 
to acquire agricultural inputs. In the dry sea-
son, animals are in better shape, supply is 
lower and prices higher. In Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, livestock traders travel from commu-
nity to community to buy animals. These ani-
mals are taken to enclosures located on main 
roadways. Livestock are taken from such en-
closures to urban areas. Some 80 percent of 
livestock sold in Sierra Leone go to Freetown, 
with the remainder to urban areas such as 
Makeni or to Liberia.” 
(FEWS NET et al., 2010a).
27 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/publications/sector_briefs/
lsb_LBR.pdf
28 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/publications/sector_briefs/
lsb_SLE.pdf
29 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/resources/en/publications/sector_briefs/
lsb_GIN.pdf
30 Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2003
31 CoreWelfareIndicators Questionnaire, Liberia, 2007
32 Enquête Intégrée de Base pour l’Evaluation de la Pauvreté en Guinée, 
2007
33 “But Guinea reportedly has nearly 5 million heads of cattle, yet the total 
volume of imports and exports, according to official statistics, is about  
21 000 or less than 0.5 percent of the estimated herd size. The numbers 
are similar for small ruminants, with around 3.5 million small ruminants 
and total volume of imports and exports combined at only 20 000” 
(USAID, 2012).
34 Weingartl et al. Nature 811 (2012)
Table 4. Meat consumption in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea
Box 1. Livestock cross-border trade, Liberia and Sierra Leone
Items Sierra Leone Liberia Guinea
Meat consumption kg/cap/year 6.527 (2002) 728 (2005) 1029 (2002)
% home-consumption 5230 (2003) 3531 (2007) 1732 (2007)
Source: National household surveys and FAO
Red meat and poultry production and trade (region-
al and international) are boosted by demand from 
urban areas and from administrative staff from the 
mining and plantation sectors.
Regional trade of livestock is presented on Map 9. 
Livestock is traded from Mali to Sierra Leone (via 
Kambia and Kabala) and Liberia through Guinea33. 
In Guinea, M’Boné and Dagomet are important mar-
ketplaces for livestock (with at least 11 500 heads 
of cattle per year sold from the Dagomet market, 
[Josserand, 2013)]. Most of the livestock traded in 
Upper Guinea goes to Conakry, Sierra Leone and 
to a lesser extent Liberia (25 percent of sales in the 
Dagomet market are of cattle of Malian origin). The 
vast majority goes to Conakry and around 10-20 per-
cent goes to Sierra Leone (Josserand, 2013; USAID, 
2012). In Sierra Leone, livestock trade is mainly in the 
hands of Fulani; they organize livestock transit in Ka-
bala and its transfer to the Kambia regional market 
and Freetown. During Tabaski, demand for small ru-
minants increases: imported sheep arrive on the Bar-
moi market (near Kambia) from Guinea and on the 
Kenema markets from Liberia (through Jendema). 
Forest Guinea is also developing as a supplier of pork 
and poultry for the Liberian market. Poultry sector 
development relies on imports of peanut kernels and 
fish meal from Senegal (day-old chicks are produced 
in Guinea). Fish meal is also imported from Côte 
d’Ivoire to neighbouring countries.
Ebola impact varies depending on the 
animal market chain
The risk assessment (see Annex 2) considered the 
risk associated of EVD transmission through ani-
mal products (other than meat from wild animals). 
It concluded that provided there is no contact with 
symptomatic infected people during any stage of the 
market chain, there is negligible risk of transmitting 
the Ebola virus through animal products. However, 
pork remains of some concern, as there is experi-
mental evidence for pigs being infected and able to 
transmit the disease via aerosol route to cynomol-
gus macaques34. The risk of animal products being 
contaminated has been assessed as negligible (i.e. 
so rare that it can be excluded) with processing and 
cooking.
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There was no major sign of a significant substitution 
of bushmeat by other animal products in the three 
countries. 
Fish farming may have played a partial role in sub-
stituting bushmeat. Fishing was banned on interna-
tional border rivers, since borders were closed, e.g. 
Cavalla River (Liberia/Côte d’Ivoire) and Mano River 
(Liberia/Sierra Leone), but increased in local rivers 
and ponds. In regards to sea fishing, it was report-
ed in Liberia that the EVD outbreak peak coincided 
with the rainy season and bad weather conditions, 
especially severe in 2014 in south east Liberia, during 
which fishing is limited.
Livestock production experienced little impact due to 
the EVD outbreak as livestock farmers were less likely 
to abandon their farms for fear of the disease than 
those without livestock. Regional trade was however 
disrupted. The Mali-Guinea border remained open, 
but extended delays for border control (linked to Eb-
ola checks) encouraged herders to use new routes to 
cross the border, sometimes through planted areas, 
generating conflicts with local farmers. It is likely that 
there was an impact on transhumance paths, but this 
remains to be properly documented and quantified.
Decreasing trade activities have been reported by 
Fulani herders in Koinadugu (Sierra Leone): livestock 
trade was affected by the closure of the Barmoi 
weekly market, quarantine measures reduced the 
number of buyers coming to the area and mining 
activities ceased in affected areas. Trade from Koin-
adugu to Barmoi and Freetown decreased up to 60 
percent, compared to the pre-Ebola period, which 
was partly compensated by increased demand by 
local consumers for beef in order to substitute bush-
meat. In Guinea, it was reported that at the begin-
ning of the epidemic that cattle and pigs raised in 
the forested area were associated with wild animals 
and their meat was treated with suspicion by traders 
and consumers.
Commercial poultry production and trade was af-
fected by the Ebola outbreak’s impact on imports 
of peanut, soya kernel and fish meal from Senegal, 
and fish meal and chicks from Côte d’Ivoire (disrupt-
ed by border closure and transport restrictions). The 
subsequent rising prices of animal feed (up to 75 
percent in Forest Guinea) increased production costs 
that could not be passed on to to consumer due to 
Map 9. Cattle regional trade
Source: FAO, based on (FEWS NET et al., 2010a, 2010b; Josserand, 2013) and FAO expert meeting.
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decreased purchasing power. In Liberia, the halting 
of chick imports from Côte d’Ivoire was problematic 
and lead to a reduction in commercial poultry farm-
ers’ income. Commercial pork and fish production 
relied on local feed and was thus less affected. 
Decreases in veterinary inputs supply including vac-
cines and treatments were also mentioned with no 
clear impact on the sanitary status of herds at the 
time the report was written.
Moreover, in Forest Guinea, the border closure with 
Liberia halted exportation of poultry, eggs and pork 
and strongly affected the dynamic association of live-
stock producers in Macenta whose members were 
developing exports to meet the demand of a grow-
ing Liberian market. 
Different factors have contributed to decreased de-
mand for some animal products, such as fear of an-
imal products originating from affected areas, the 
evacuation of managerial and supervisory personnel 
from the mining sector, and more broadly, consum-
ers’ lower purchasing power. Decreased purchasing 
power probably contributed to keep animal prod-
uct prices low in affected areas (FAO-WFP-Guinea, 
2014). In urban areas, increases in prices were 
recorded (up by 40 percent for fish in Sierra Leone 
urban markets, FAO-Sierra Leone, 2014a).
Conclusion and recommendations
Bans on bushmeat did not lead to a major increase 
in demand for other animal products, even in Liberia 
where bushmeat consumption is usually high in rural 
areas. 
Bushmeat consumption may have been replaced by 
the consumption of small livestock (poultry, pigs, 
small ruminants) and this has consequently led to 
farm decapitalization. If confirmed, animal restock-
ing should be targeted to help households recover 
from the EVD epidemic. 
Animal product chains have been diversely affected 
by the EVD outbreak. The commercial poultry sector 
has suffered from its dependence on imported feed, 
unlike fish and pork production. Reopening of bor-
ders should be organized for feed and animal trade. 
As suggested in the risk assessment, given that in the 
event of infection, pigs are expected to show severe 
clinical signs, a veterinary certification that the pigs 
are in good health should be required (which is al-
ready the case, for example, for pigs exported from 
Guinea to Liberia) and a period of quarantine before 
trading the animals will mitigate the risk and allow 
cross-border trade to resume safely.
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A significant role in nutrition, income gen-
eration and pest control
It is difficult to assess the hunting, sale and consump-
tion of bushmeat (or wildmeat)36 because it is con-
fined to the informal, and sometimes illicit, sector. 
Furthermore, data is difficult to interpret as units 
used often lack precision (e.g. whole, emptied or de-
boned carcasses, or portions/cuts). 
Data available for the Congo Basin indicate an annual 
production of 5 million tonnes of bushmeat (twice the 
annual beef production in France, and two-thirds of 
Brazilian production) and a consumption of 7 kg/cap-
ita/year for urban populations and 51 kg/capita/year 
for rural populations (Nasi, Taber, & Van Vliet, 2011).
Updated data on the consumption of wildlife prod-
ucts in West Africa is lacking. Studies conducted in 
the 1990s indicate the importance of bushmeat in 
the sub-region: Anstey estimated that three-quarters 
of Liberian meat production came from bushmeat, 
with subsistence hunting yielding as much as 105 000 
tonnes of meat annually (Anstey, 1991). In the 1990s, 
bushmeat represented up to 80-90 percent of animal 
protein consumed in Liberia, 75 percent of animal 
protein consumed in rural Ghana and 20 percent of 
animal protein consumed by communities living in 
tropical wet forests in Nigeria (Ntiamoa-Baidu, 1997).
Nevertheless the situation has changed with urban-
ization, deforestation and reductions in wild animal 
populations. 
More accurate data (see figures and tables below) 
indicate that bushmeat represented up to 23 per-
cent of the value of meat consumption in Liberian 
rural areas and 7 percent in the capital, Monrovia37. 
However, the figures are lower for Guinea38 (respec-
tively 18 percent in rural areas and one percent in 
Conakry) and Sierra Leone (five percent in rural areas 
and less than one percent in Freetown)39. Hunting 
products are mainly used for home consumption – in 
Liberia, according to the same source, 62 percent of 
the value of consumed bushmeat comes from local 
hunting. It is also a form of pest control and rodents 
represent an important share of the catch (57.5 per-
Highlights
•	Bushmeat	 plays	 an	 important	 economic	 and	
nutritional role in the affected areas, although 
this role is decreasing  
•	Due	 to	 EVD,	 bushmeat	 consumption	 has	 de-
creased, especially in urban areas, but with no 
significant substitution effect on other products. 
•	Recommendations	include:
o Making the most of  the post-Ebola recovery 
phase to rapidly agree on and draft regula-
tions, ensuring compliance and improving 
communication messages to guide and con-
trol bushmeat market-chain stakeholders’ 
activities. recognizing that they will other 
 
 
wise likely resume pre-Ebola habits. Measures 
should be proportionate to risk and should be 
addressed to a broad audience, from hunters 
to consumers.
o Bans on hunting and bushmeat consumption 
could be imposed for bats, wild mammals, 
wild antelopes and any sick (weak) or dead 
wild animals.
o Communication on risks associated with 
bushmeat should also target children given 
that they often participate in busmeat hunt-
ing in rural and peri-forest areas.
3.6 Bushmeat35
35 This chapter benefitted from the contribution of N. Bricas, Ch. Fargeot, 
S. Lebel, F. Roger (Cirad) and includes parts of FAO mission report (J. 
Bonwitt et al, FAO 2015a) on “Bushmeat value chain analysis in EVD 
context”, and FAO/AGAH technical report (Plee L. FAO 2015b) “Address-
ing Zaire Ebola virus outbreaks. Rapid Qualitative Exposure and Release 
Assessment”
36 We consider “bushmeat” and “wildmeat” as synonymous in this report 
although we are aware of the existing debate on these two terms.
37 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire, Liberia, 2007
38 Integrated Baseline Poverty Evaluation Survey in Guinea, 2007
39 Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2003
40 In markets, ungulates dominate with 75 percent  of sales, 15 percent  
for rodents and 8 percent for primates This same study estimates that 
hunting provides an income of USD 27/hunter/month (Bene et al., 2013).
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cent) according to a study conducted in Northern 
Nimba county in Liberia (Bene, Gamys, & Dufour, 
2013)40.
While the meat of certain wild animals is considered 
a luxury by some urban consumers, bushmeat is 
more often consumed in rural areas by poor house-
holds for whom it is the most affordable meat. In the 
1990s, its price was often lower than that of other 
types of meat in Central Africa (Bahuchet, 2000). 
Bushmeat consumption may in some cases be limit-
ed by religious prohibitions (Islam) or totemic restric-
tions (the case of cat, monkey or some rat species in 
Guinea) (FAO 2015a).
For Crookes and Milner-Gulland (2006), the sus-
tainability of hunting is at risk due to increasing de-
mand for bushmeat, population growth and the loss 
of native wild species. Increasing demand is linked 
to growing rural poverty and demand from urban 
populations, improved gun technology, road infra-
structure and weak natural resources conservation 
governance. However, other authors (Fargeot 2013) 
feel that urbanization and urban consumer habits 
are contributing to reducing demand for bushmeat.
41 http://www.bushmeat.org/bushmeat_and_wildlife_trade/what_is_the_
bushmeat_crisis
From the late 1980s, on the initiative of the con-
servation movement, research has been conduct-
ed on bushmeat to assess the impact of hunting 
on protected species. Most of these studies were 
carried out near protected areas and focused on 
the hunting of large mammals threatened with 
extinction and on commercial hunting. It is only 
later that the study of the socio-economic and 
nutritional dimensions of hunting gave rise to 
better understanding of new aspects: hunting of 
small species (rodents, small antelopes) that were 
of little interest for bushmeat consumer, hunting 
in anthropized areas (on the confines of farms) 
and hunting for one’s own consumption. 
The bushmeat sector is relatively well understood 
in the Central African zone where much research 
has been undertaken (see summary in Fargeot 
2013). In West Africa, hunting resources are less 
abundant and conservation issues are less present 
than in Central Africa. Research on bushmeat is 
thus more scarce. 
There are generally considered to be two oppos-
ing views on the consumption of bushmeat. The 
first view condemns bushmeat hunting as a threat 
to biodiversity caused by high rates of hunting. 
It is adopted by several NGOs (WCS, WWF, etc.) 
that have joined forces under the “Wildmeat Cri-
sis Taskforce”41 and recommend to halt bushmeat 
consumption as it threatens the survival of several 
species, encourages criminal activity (95 percent 
of the market chain is illegal), and for ethical rea-
sons. The AIDS crisis and now the EVD epidem-
ic offer new arguments to remind people of the 
health risks associated with the consumption of 
bushmeat. In the opposing view, the emphasis is 
on the fact that hunting is kept at reasonable and 
sustainable levels (hunting is always regulated in 
some way) and concerns mostly “common” fau-
na (rodents, small antelopes, etc.) that are in part 
associated with anthropized environments. Bush-
meat here is also considered as contributing to 
the food security of many households and com-
munities in rural Africa, with traditional prepara-
tion and cooking practices (drying, long cooking) 
supposedly limiting health risks. The debate on 
bushmeat in the context of the Ebola health crisis 
is reviving these two approaches. 
Box 2. Different approaches of bushmeat
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Figure 2. Value of bushmeat and non-bushmeat consumption, Guinea (per capita, in national currency)
Source: Bricas and Figuié, based on a national survey (Integrated Baseline Poverty Evaluation Survey in Guinea, 2007).
Table 5. Bushmeat consumption (share in value), Guinea
Republic of Guinea Entire country Conakry Others cities Rural
Share of bushmeat in the value of 
meat consumption (%)
10 1 4 18
Home -consumption of bushmeat in 
total bushmeat consumption (%)
38 0 10 41
Source: Bricas and Figuié, based on a national survey (Integrated baseline survey on poverty evaluation in Guinea 2007).
Figure 3. Value of bushmeat and non-bushmeat consumption, Liberia (per capita, in national currency)
Source: Bricas and Figuié, based on a national survey (Liberia Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 2007).
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Table 6. Bushmeat consumption (share in value), Liberia
Liberia Entire country Greater Monrovia Others cities Rural
Share of bushmeat in the value of 
meat consumption (%)
17 7 7 23
Home - consumption of bushmeat in 
total bushmeat consumption (%)
54 5 18 62
Source: Bricas and Figuié, based on a national survey (Liberia Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 2007).
Figure 4. Value of bushmeat and non-bushmeat consumption, Sierra Leone (per capita, in national currency)
Source: Bricas and Figuié, based on a national survey (Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2003).
Table 7. Bushmeat consumption (share in value). Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone Entire country Freetown Others cities Rural
Share of bushmeat in the value of 
meat consumption (%)
3 0 2 5
Source: Bricas and Figuié, based on a national survey (Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2003).
A study conducted in Guinea (FAO 2015a) lists sev-
eral reasons that bushmeat hunting and consump-
tion is popular in the country: 
•	 Access	 to	 inexpensive	sources	of	protein	and	to	
delicacies (a small quantity is sufficient to flavour 
a dish);
•	 Health:	the	cane	rat	(Thryonomys spp.), for exam-
ple, is considered a lean meat particularly suited 
for the elderly or those suffering from hyperten-
sion; monkey brains are used to treat dizziness; 
dried intestines of porcupines to treat stomach 
aches; warthog or buffalo ears to treat fever, etc.;
•	 As	 a	 means	 of	 undertaking	 an	 activity	 that	 is	
highly valued from a socio-cultural perspective in 
rural areas. Hunters enjoy a special social status 
and hunting products sometimes have a “cere-
monial” function (ex: red-backed duiker organs 
distributed to the family during weddings in some 
forest ethnic groups).
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The bushmeat market chain before Ebola
The organization of the bushmeat market chain is 
presented in Figure 5 for Côte d’Ivoire. More detailed 
information is provided by the FAO study in Guinea 
(FAO, 2015a).
The market chain in Guinea is made up of several 
categories (see also Box 3):
•	 Subsistence	hunting
 This includes domestic (family) hunting and con-
sumption at a local level. Included within this cat-
egory are all forms of capturing animals (traps, 
net traps, smoking of burrows) and it mainly 
concerns small and medium-sized catch (hedge-
hogs, porcupines, duikers, pangolins, antelopes, 
primates, rodents and bats). This category also 
includes children’s hunting of small species that 
are easy to catch such as rodents (with traps) and 
bats (with slingshots or fire).
•	 Commercial	hunting
 
 Commercial hunting is part of a market chain 
that is relatively organized and includes hunt-
ers, processors/wholesalers, transporters, retail-
ers and consumers. Hunters often work directly 
with wholesalers who accompany them on hunts 
and smoke the meat on site. The meat is then 
transported in 50 kg bags to consumption zones 
and is subject to a Ministry of Environment levy. 
Retailers (who are sometimes also wholesalers) 
are mainly women and play a crucial role in pre-
paring, transporting and selling bushmeat. Upper 
Guinea and Middle Guinea are the main hunt-
ing areas, while Forest Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone tend to be areas of consumption. The 
mainly Muslim region of Upper Guinea exports 
a large amount of warthog meat to the mainly 
Christian Forest Guinea region. The price of meat 
varies widely depending on the species and region.
•	 Professional	hunting
 This hunting involves large species including 
buffalo, and more rarely hippopotami (protect-
ed species) that represent a potential threat for 
farmers’crops. Authorization from local forest au-
thorities is required.
Processing
•	 Drying/smoking/curing: the meat is cut and 
boiled at the hunting site. It is then covered with 
leaves, dried and smoked on a rack for at least 24 
hours.
•	 Smoked meat can be stored for several weeks 
or kept under oil to be consumed during the lean 
season.
•	 Game	(butchered	or	whole)	is	sold	fresh	if	it	has	
been hunted within 50 km of the place of sale.
Studies from Cameroon suggest that a third of the 
meat on the market in Yaoundé is sold fresh and pri-
marily (80 percent) by women butcher-sellers (Bahu-
chet, 2000). Bahuchet notes that in the early 1990s, 
resellers in Cameroon had the highest profit margins 
with prices that could increase by a factor of three to 
ten (Bahuchet, 2000). 
According to Davies, Schulte-Herbruggen, 
Kumpel, and Mendelson (2007), there is a wide 
variety of types of hunters. At one extreme are 
people for whom hunting is their primary ac-
tivity, at least at certain times of the year and 
who hunt in their region of origin and from 
temporary camps in zones with low human 
presence. They seek high market value species 
and may hunt protected species. At the other 
extreme are farmers who hunt around their vil-
lages or in the “farmbush”, often with traps, 
looking for the nutritional value of meat and 
to reduce pest damage to their crops (Davies 
2007). Hunters are sometimes organized in 
powerful fraternities (as in Guinea) that can 
take the form of paramilitary groups, as was 
observed during the civil war in Sierra Leone 
(FAO 2015a). 
Box 3. Types of hunters
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A press article published in Burkina Faso (Wel-
man Guingan, Sept. 2011) provides details on 
the hunting of fruit bats. In the country, the fruit-
bat hunting season is opened by ministerial de-
cree for a period of two months (generally from 
1 July to 31 August). Hunters are obliged to have 
a special fruit bat hunting permit (FCFA 5 000 for 
nationals and FCFA 25 000 for foreigners). One 
single fireshot can kill up to a dozen bats and a 
hunter can catch 45-50 bats in one day. In Oua-
gadougou, several restaurants offer dishes with 
bats: restaurant owners buy the bats at FCFA 500 
from the hunters and sell cooked dishes between 
FCFA 750 and 1000 (these prices may be lower in 
other areas as in Ouargaye where bats cost FCFA 
250 per unit and bat dishes are sold at FCFA 500). 
In 2014, hunting was suspended at the end the 
month of July due to Ebola-related risks.
Figure 5. Bushmeat supply chain in Côte d’Ivoire
Source: Caspary (1999)
Box 4. Hunting of bats in Burkina Faso
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Bushmeat exports 
Cross-border trade is abundant between Guinea, 
Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Over longer distances, 
7 500 tonnes of illegal meat enters the United King-
dom each year, the bulk of which is bushmeat42. 
These figures may be even higher: Chaber et al. 
estimate that each week, five tonnes of bushmeat 
are imported illegally in the personal luggage of trav-
ellers arriving at the Paris CDG airport in France, for 
both personal consumption and trade (Chaber, Al-
lebone-Webb, Lignereux, Cunningham, & Rowcliffe, 
2010). However, this figure is considered an over- 
estimation by several experts. 
In the United States, imports of bushmeat are forbid-
den and subject to a USD 250 000 fine (CDC 2014 
cited by [IUFoST, 2014 Nov.]).
Major impact on bushmeat trade and 
urban consumption but minor impact on 
rural consumption
Soon after the outbreak of the EVD epidemic, the 
hunting, trading and consumption of wild animals 
was banned and awareness-raising messages were 
spread in an effort to stop the consumption of some 
or all species of wild animals. It is important to high-
light that with the exception of at least one zoonotic 
case (the likely index case), the EVD epidemic was 
spread due to sustained human-to-human transmis-
sion (Baize et al., 2014; Gire et al., 2014). 
In early 2015, FAO released a rapid qualitative expo-
sure assessment in order to evaluate the role of wild 
meat and related activities in the spread of the Zaire 
Ebola Virus (EBOV) to the human populations (FAO, 
2015 b). The report concludes (Box 5) that the likeli-
hood of spillover to a human being from wild mam-
malian species is very low. Nevertheless, the report 
noted that: “Even if such spillovers can be viewed 
as rare events, their consequences are nonetheless 
disastrous”.
42 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2713707/Secret-trade-mon-
key-meat-unleash-Ebola-UK-How-appetite-African-delicacies-British-mar-
kets-stalls-spread-killer-virus.html#ixzz3CpntQvbl
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In the past, various measures have been taken to 
restrict the hunting and consumption of bushmeat 
in order to protect wildlife in Africa. Most measures 
attempt to prevent poaching and are very expensive 
and not very effective (Damania & Bulte, 2007). Other 
tools are recommended, notably through market 
chain action (“supply side policies”). For example, 
plans to supply the market with farmed bushmeat 
have been sometimes recommended. However, 
Damania and Bulte (2007) believe these measures 
can be counterproductive: the risk is to reduce pric-
es of both bushmeat from the bush and farmed 
bushmeat, thus increasing pressure on the hunted 
resources. According to several sources, the best way 
to change hunting behaviour is information/educa-
tion (Le Breton et al., 2006). 
The bushmeat market chain was severely affected by 
the EVD outbreak. This might be related to the bans 
on bushmeat, or more probably to the fear of the 
disease itself. Field studies in Guinea (FAO, 2015a) 
show that there was significant confusion and doubt 
for hunters, marketers and consumers throughout 
the market chain on the role of wildlife and bush-
meat in the spread of EVD. It is of note, however, 
that bats, primates and other animals found dead 
were generally avoided since the beginning of the 
epidemic43. A disconnect was noted between the 
very general awareness raising messages circulated 
on health risks related to bushmeat, and communi-
ties’ perception of risks, which varied significantly ac-
cording to the types of human-animal contacts, the 
wild species concerned, their habitat and the type of 
product consumed (fresh versus cured meat).
A halt in hunting and bushmeat trade following the 
bans might indicate, according to the figures quot-
ed previously, a loss of income of USD 27/month for 
hunters and a decrease in meat consumption of 5 
to 23 percent (in value) in rural areas, depending on 
the country. However, it is highly likely that bush-
meat consumption has not ceased in many rural are-
as where wild animals represent the most affordable 
source of meat, with the exception of the hunting 
and consumption of bats and primates which has 
likely decreased since the EVD outbreak. In Guinea, 
children still hunt small animals to eat as a snack. 
According to the FAO study, in Kankan, hunters did 
accepted the ban on hunting for cultural or food se-
curity reasons and also because of ongoing doubts 
and scepticism on the actual existence of EVD. How-
ever, hunters interviewed in Forest Guinea reported 
having halted hunting bats and primates and collect-
ing animals found dead.
The same study indicated that commercial hunting 
was most affected. Some sellers lost a significant part 
of their capital during the confiscation and destruc-
tion of bushmeat stocks. Some of them nevertheless 
continued their activities illegally, but most are still 
reluctant to invest in bags of meat (the value of a 
bag of wild meat is around GNF 1-5 million, equiva-
lent to USD 140-710) given the risk of confiscation. 
Some have converted to selling other products, such 
as dried fish. Nevertheless, apart from bats and pri-
mates for which consumers remain afraid, bushmeat 
dishes in small local restaurants can be found easily.
The FAO study showed that the announcement of 
the end of the epidemic could incite market-chain 
players to return rapidly to their previous activities.
Conclusion and recommendations
According to the testimonies of some observers in 
rural areas, bushmeat consumption may not have 
decreased significantly. Stopping bushmeat hunting 
and consumption may be difficult for food-insecure 
households because of reduced income, production 
and access to markets. Moreover, reducing hunting 
of pests may lead to increasing crop damage. There-
fore, hunting bans could be focused on some specific 
species as suggested by the FAO rapid risk assess-
ment (FAO 2015b).
43 As of today, the only species found naturally infected (and symptomatic) 
with EVD are gorillas, chimpanzees and duikers. 
44 http://www.voanews.com/content/amid-ebola-scare-nigeria-shuns-danc-
ing-monkeys-bush-meat/2428545.html
Nigeria. “Musa Maibigidar, who makes his 
living hunting monkeys and other animals 
to be sold as meat at the market, says the 
local hunters’ union has agreed not to hunt 
for now, but they will go back to work when 
the weather is dry. Maibigidar believes offi-
cials who say Ebola can be transmitted from 
animals to people - even though this has nev-
er happened in Nigeria, where people have 
been eating bushmeat as long as anyone can 
remember”. Maibigidar says for now, people 
aren’t even buying bushmeat for fear of Eb-
ola.  But like the hunters, he thinks people 
will eventually be more afraid of hunger than 
disease44” VOA News, 26 August, 2014.
Box 5. Hunter and trader reaction to the bushmeat ban
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Communities should be advised that:
•	 Hunting,	 slaughtering,	 selling,	 preparing	 and	
consuming bushmeat that originates from any 
species of bats should be avoided at all times;
•	 Handling, slaughtering, selling, preparing and 
consuming bushmeat that originates from mam-
malian species, such as gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and wild antelopes 
(Cephalus spp.) found sick or dead should be 
avoided. Since these species are protected, their 
hunting should be prohibited in any case.
Communication on risks associated with bushmeat 
should also target children who hunt in rural areas. 
The messages should also clarify the EVD risk associ-
ated with domestic animals raised near forested ar-
eas (because this is confusing for some consumers).
 
The situation also raises the issue of the impact of 
different projects whose aim is to reduce bushmeat 
consumption and offer alternative products in or-
der to protect wild animals. Game ranching is one 
of these alternatives. However, in Benin, cane rat 
production was also affected by EVD through restric-
tions on bushmeat and consumer fear, although no 
EVD was ever reported. Poultry and guinea pig pro-
duction are other alternatives; nonetheless, commer-
cial poultry production in Guinea demonstrated the 
fragility of animal production due to its dependence 
on imported feed.
It is important to reflect now on the measures to 
be taken for the bushmeat market chain when the 
epidemic has ended, including continued commu-
nication campaigns targeting urban and rural resi-
dents. Additionally, policy decisions must be taken 
on whether to reopen or partially continue the ban 
on hunting, trade and consumption of bushmeat 
and how it can be better regulated, and tracked. It 
is essential to draft pragmatic and consistent regula-
tions and to develop clear communication strategies 
to avoid hesitation and confusion.
Boxes 6 to 10 provide complementary information 
from scientific studies on bushmeat in West Africa.
In Sierra Leone, the hunting and trade of wild 
animal products essentially take place near pro-
tected areas (4.5 percent of the territory), forest 
areas (38.5 percent of the territory)45 and farm-
bush areas.
A study undertaken in different sites in the south 
of the country by Subramanian in 2012 shows 
that hunting is widely practised on a regular basis 
(at least once a week) and in 70 percent of cases 
it is for consumption and trade. This kind of 
hunting essentially relies on wire snare traps and 
dogs and never uses fire arms. 
Preferred species are rodents, in particular the 
greater cane rat (Trynomis swinderianus), Max-
well’s duiker (Philantomba maxwellii) and the 
bushbuck (Tragelaphus scriptus); there is less de-
mand for chimpanzees, buffalos and warthogs 
(Subramanian 2004). 
Subramanian (2012) showed that although men 
do the hunting, it is women that dress the car-
cass and butcher the meat and are thus propor-
tionally more often exposed to infection than 
the hunters themselves. The study showed that 
24 percent of those surveyed were aware of the 
risks of transmission of zoonotic diseases linked 
to hunting and the consumption of bushmeat.46
In Sierra Leone, ungulates represent around 30 
percent of sales, while primates and rodents rep-
resent 50.5 percent and 11.5 percent of sales 
respectively (Davies et al., 2007). Some ethnic 
groups in Sierra Leone have taboos about the 
consumption of some great apes (as is the case 
in parts of Equatorial Guinea and eastern DRC) 
whereas other groups prefer to hunt great apes 
(Davies et al., 2007).
Box 6. Studies on bushmeat in Sierra Leone
45 http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20sierraleone.htm
46 For the perception of risks see also Adefalu et al., 2012; Le Breton et al., 
2006)
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Anstey (1991) produced a study that showed 
that in 1989 bushmeat represented 75 percent 
of meat produced in Liberia and had a trade val-
ue of USD 24 million, greater than the value of 
the trade in wood (USD 20 million). Bushmeat 
procured USD 100 to 120 per month in revenue 
for women sellers; the market sales price was 2 
to 3 times higher than what was paid to hunters. 
According to Anstey (1991), 97 percent of peo-
ple in Liberia in 1989/1990 consumed bushmeat. 
In 2013, hunting procured a revenue of USD 27 
per hunter per month for hunters in Mount Nim-
ba in the north of the country (Bene et al., 2013).
Hoyt (2004) described the bushmeat market 
chain in Liberia which showed that it was target-
ed both towards home consumption and trade, 
with direct sales made by hunters or via collec-
tors (often women) and sometimes via “con-
tracts” (where a seller or transporter provides 
in advance munitions to hunters). In a survey of 
urban consumers (in 2002), only half of respond-
ents said they had not consumed any bushmeat 
over the course of the previous week. Preferred 
species were the cane rat, the water chevrotain, 
the giant pangolin, the black duiker, the brush-
tailed porcupine and the bushbuck. The majori-
ty of respondents did not know whether any of 
these species were protected and did not think 
that they were likely to disappear (Hoyt, 2004). 
Bene et al. (2013) carried out research on hunt-
ing in Mount Nimba in northern Liberia. The 
hunters there are farmers who use arms and 
traps to catch mainly rodents (57.5 percent of 
the catch), ungulates (20.5 percent), carnivores 
(13 percent) and primates (3 percent). The meat 
is mainly used for family consumption. Part of it 
is sold on local markets or goes to neighbour-
ing countries (Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire) with whom 
trade is vibrant (there is movement of bushmeat 
in both directions). The relative importance of 
species varies according to the points of the 
market chain. In marketplaces, one finds mostly 
ungulates (75 percent), rodents (15 percent) and 
primates (8 percent) with, in order of importance, 
mangabey, Campbell’s monkey, Diana monkey, 
and lesser spot nosed baboon. In restaurants, 
wild swine species predominate.
Box 7. Studies on bushmeat in Liberia
Ziegler (1996) carried out a study on hunting 
in the Upper Niger national park (Guinea). The 
study shows that hunters travel up to 30 km from 
their villages to hunt with arms, alone or in small 
groups of less than five, and cut and smoke their 
catch at the hunting site. Hunting is more intense 
during the dry season (except for baboons which 
are hunted during the rainy season to protect 
crops) and is most often practised at night and 
before market days.
Dufour (2013) estimated that 3 912 kg of animal 
biomass were hunted over a 12 month period in 
Forecariah/Kounoukan (for 223 hunters), 5 475 
kg in Fouta Djallon (275 hunters) and 5 181kg 
in Upper Niger (180 hunters) with a frequency of 
bushmeat consumption of once to three times a 
week.
Brugiere and Magassouba (2009) estimated that 
the annual catch of 16 villages (8 500 inhabit-
ants) in the Upper Niger park was 335 000 kg/
year, of which, 53.5 percent was ungulates and 
25 percent was rodents – 81 percent and 11.5 
percent in terms of biomass respectively. They es-
timated that 40 percent of the bushmeat hunt-
ed was home-consumed (with a range of 20 to 
70 percent between villages). Trade in bushmeat 
corresponded to 35.2 kg per habitant per year.
Primates were hunted to the extent that they 
posed a threat to farming during the rainy sea-
son. Muslims (mainly Malinkes) do not consume 
the meat of primates (Brugiere & Magassouba, 
2009). 
Box 8. Studies on bushmeat in Guinea
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In Côte d’Ivoire in 1999, according to Caspary 
(1999), national consumption of bushmeat was 
twice as much as the national production of 
farmed meat and provided half the animal pro-
tein consumed by farmers. In 1990, an average 
quantity of 20.3 g of game meat per person/day 
was consumed, with urban bushmeat consump-
tion amounting to 8.7 g/person/day. People liv-
ing in urban environments consumed 3.5 times 
less bushmeat than rural inhabitants (30.4 g/
person/day) (Chardonnet, 1995). In 1990, overall 
bushmeat consumption was estimated at 83 500 
t/year. (figures based on the results of the 1979 0 
and an assumed home-consumption rate of the 
rural population of 80 percent - Chardonnet et 
al, 1995.)
Hunting represented 1.4 percent of GDP, a fig-
ure comparable to the contribution of the wood 
sector and higher than the contribution of ba-
nana or pineapple (Caspary, 1999), where 120 
000 tonnes of carcasses were caught in 1996 in 
Côte d’Ivoire, 50 percent of which were cane rats 
and squirrels. 
Box 9. Studies on bushmeat in Côte d’Ivoire
In the 1990s , it was estimated that approximately 
80 percent  of animal protein consumed in Ghana 
was derived from wildlife including fish (Caspary, 
1999). More recent research (Schulte-Herbrug-
gen, Cowlishaw, Homewood, & Rowcliffe, 2013) 
showed that the consumption of bushmeat in 
Ghana “…[enables] households to spend 30 per-
cent less on meat/fish purchases.” The authors 
suggest that, despite heavily depleted wildlife 
and diversified livelihoods, bushmeat continues 
to play an important role in rural life by acting 
as a safety net for income supplementation and 
reducing household expenditures during times of 
economic hardship.
Box 10. Studies on bushmeat in Ghana
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An important cash crop for smallholder 
farmers in the area
West Africa is a major area for cocoa production 
(accounting for two-thirds of world production), 
with Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s top cocoa produc-
er, accounting for 39 percent of global production 
(ECOWAS-SWAC & OECD, 2007). 
The three main countries affected by Ebola – Libe-
ria, Sierra Leone and Guinea – only account for 0.7 
percent of global cocoa production (International 
Cocoa Organization). Nevertheless cocoa is an im-
portant product for smallholders’ livelihoods in the 
three countries. A significant share of smallholders 
are involved in cocoa production (two to three mil-
lion farmers produce cocoa in West Africa48) contrib-
uting from 84 to 95 percent of cocoa production de-
pending on the country (see Table 8). Cocoa is a cash 
crop that is easily accessible to smallholders as it has 
low input and labour requirements: it can generate 
an additional income of USD 1 000/year for a farmer 
investing 20 days of work per year, producing 500 kg 
of cocoa with no inputs (Bastide personal communi-
cation). Agro-industrial production is limited but is 
attracting growing international investment (mainly 
in Liberia since 2010) and provides income in rural 
areas (around USD 50/month for a non-skilled work-
er employed on a plantation). 
The main cocoa production areas are the eastern 
districts of Kailahun, Kenema, and Kono in Sierra 
Leone; Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties in Liberia; 
and Forest Guinea. The production is exported to 
consumer countries. While production is dominated 
by smallholders, the high financial requirements to 
enter the cocoa trade exclude small traders from the 
business. Trade is in hands of big trade companies 
Highlights
•	Ebola	disrupted	the	collection	of	the	cocoa	har-
vest at the farm level as well as transport for 
shipping, leading to post-harvest losses and 
affecting smallholders’ access to imported rice 
(the cocoa and rice market chains are inter-
twined). 
•	The	 impact	 on	 the	 global	 cocoa	 market	 was	
minimal owing to the fact that Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea’s contribution to global pro-
duction is relatively small.
•	The	 impact	of	 Ebola	on	 the	 income	of	 small-
holders involved in cocoa production in the af-
fected countries points to the dramatic effects 
a similar epidemic or an expansion of the EVD 
outbreak could have in countries such as Côte 
d’Ivoire, which is highly dependent on cocoa 
production. 
•	Recommendations	are	related	to	the	organiza-
tion of a trade corridor to facilitate the collec-
tion of the cocoa production.
3.7 Cocoa47
47 Thanks to Ph. Batside and T. Ruf, Cirad.
48 According to Tim McCoy, spokesman for the World Cocoa Foundation, 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/10/how_is_ebola_af-
fecting_west_af.html
Table 8. Cocoa: Production and share of smallholder production in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone
Country of production Production (1) 
(1 000 t/year)
Share of smallholder production 
(2) (%)
Côte d’Ivoire 1 600 98
Guinea 4 95
Liberia 8.5 85
Sierra Leone 11 84
Source: (1) ICCO and (2) Ph. Bastide, Cirad, personal communication
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such as the African Coffee and Cocoa Company Lim-
ited or the Kailahun Produce Company in Sierra Leo-
ne, and Lebanese traders. Interestingly, in remote ar-
eas, “the cocoa and imported rice market chains are 
tightly intertwined – the cocoa buyer is an imported 
rice seller, the cocoa seller is a rice buyer (…). Cocoa 
and rice are bought and sold from the same shops. 
As both markets are concentrated, the cocoa/rice 
traders wield a high degree of influence on [cocoa] 
producer food access” (FEWS NET et al., 2010a). Re-
garding cross-border trade, the CFSAM report for 
Sierra Leone mentions that “Although 2014 cocoa 
production is estimated to be normal, exports have 
fallen by 30 percent, according to a new report by 
“Welt Hunger Hilfe”. The estimated drop in exports 
was driven by reduced cross-border trade and limit-
ed commodity inflow from neighbouring countries” 
(FAO & WFP, 2014 ).
Cocoa trade strongly disrupted in affected 
countries, but with no lasting effect on 
the international market
Cocoa harvesting lasts for several months once or 
twice a year (ICCO). In Liberia, the mid-crop season 
takes place from April to September and the main 
crop season from September to April. A good pro-
duction was expected for 2014 but the Ebola out-
break erupted in the main cocoa producing areas. 
Labour shortages - due to sickness, people leaving 
the affected areas (up to 40 percent of people left 
cocoa areas in some specific areas according to FAO’s 
rapid assessment report on Kailahun conducted in 
August 2014 and the World Bank [2014]) and the 
difficulties of gathering for collective work may have 
affected the harvest of the mid-crop season when 
the disease started, as well as post-production ac-
tivities. 
For the main crop season (starting in October in Li-
beria), group work largly resumed in Liberia and pro-
duction is estimated to be normal (CFSAM) although 
Sierra Leone was hit with heavy rains in November 
2014.
Most problems were caused by the disruption of trade 
activities. Purchase stores closed and there were few 
buyers due to traders’ and drivers’ fear or inability 
to access production areas (because of health meas-
ures such as quarantine and Ebola checkpoints) and 
to ship the production once collected. The mid-crop 
harvest – which represents 15 to 20 percent  of the 
annual crop according to ICCO49 – was not collected 
in many areas, and cocoa production and exports fell 
by approximately a quarter to a third in Guinea (CEA, 
2014 ).
Traders’ activities may also have been reduced due 
to limited access to funds because of bank closures, 
and traders who had pre-financed producers were 
not always reimbursed. 
In this context, many producers were left with their 
production on hand. The absence of storage facilities/
warehouses led to high levels of post-harvest losses 
and reduced quality of the product. A few buyers 
came back after the beginning of the epidemic to 
buy production that was still marketable in terms of 
quality. Their low number was highly unfavourable 
to producers’ bargaining power, who bartered cocoa 
for rice (as is regular practiced). Prices paid to pro-
ducers were said to be low but no data is available.
Considering that combined cocoa production in 
these three countries represents only about 0.7 per-
cent of global output, the impact has been minor on 
the global cocoa market.
Nevertheless, international financial markets con-
sider cocoa and gold to be the most “at risk” com-
modities in relation to Ebola (Deutsche Bank Ana-
lyst, Oct. 2014). This is independent of the sanitary 
quality of the product itself in relation to Ebola (the 
rapid qualitative risk assessment concludes that this 
risk is negligible, see Annex 2) but due to the fear 
that Ebola may reach major producer countries such 
as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana or the countries provid-
ing labour (such as Mali and Burkina Faso for Ivoirian 
cocoa plantations). These fears led to a short-term 
price increase in April 2014 on the international mar-
ket (+ 200 USD/t).
Conclusions and recommendations
The Ebola outbreak disrupted cocoa harvest collec-
tion from farms and transport for shipping, led to 
post-harvest losses and affected smallholders’ in-
come and access to imported rice. The impact has 
been minor on the global cocoa market owing to 
the minimal contribution of these three countries to 
global production. 
Recommendations are related to the organization 
of a trade corridor to facilitate cross-border trade 
49 http://www.icco.org/faq/58-cocoa-harvesting/131-what-time-of-year-is-
cocoa-harvested.html
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50 http://www.ebolamaritimeawareness.com/
and ensure that harvested cocoa can reach shipping 
points for export to global markets. 
Trade corridors in the context of Ebola need to be 
implemented through intersectoral cooperation be-
tween departments in charge of health, transport, 
agriculture and customs as well as cooperation be-
tween public and private sectors. At the internation-
al level, FAO, WHO, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the World Customs Organi-
zation (WCO) could be involved.
The IOM recommends in the context of Ebola that 
efforts are made to “reinforce the capacity for con-
trolling borders so as to facilitate their re-opening in 
accordance with the recommendations of ECOWAS 
Ministers of Health. Controlled opening of borders 
would allow trade and social exchanges between 
communities to be organized, thus re-creating offi-
cial channels for exchange and reducing the use of 
clandestine channels, while increasing controls (in 
particular health controls) of passage. Sound plan-
ning remains essential and several options are avail-
able to organize reopening such as, for example, 
opening weekly local markets with organized and 
reinforced health and security measures, and/or the 
establishment of health cards for border residents al-
lowing limited and controlled local exchanges, and/
or the organization of ‘controlled contact’ trade ex-
changes facilitated by officials. Such measures call 
for sound preparation and coordination between the 
various actors, as well as a communication strategy 
to ensure that communities are informed and aware 
in a adapted and comprehensible manner” (IOM, 
2014).
Regarding shipping, recommendations issued on the 
Ebola Maritime Awareness collaborative website50 
should be adopted for international cocoa trade.
Clear messages should be communicated on how to 
maintain safe group work. Improved storage capac-
ities in the long term will benefit the quality of lo-
cal cocoa. To compensate income loss, interventions 
such as cash transfers should be considered. 
Attention should be extended to neighbouring 
countries, which are highly exposed. Ebola’s impact 
on the income of smallholders involved in cocoa pro-
duction in the three affected countries should alert 
to the dramatic effects the epidemic could have in 
countries highly dependent on cocoa such as Côte 
d’Ivoire.
Summary of impacts on the 
different market chains
The following table presents a summary of the EVD 
outbreak’s impacts on selected market chains; for 
each stage of the market chain, the impacts are cat-
egorized as low, medium or high.
The table shows that impacts of the EVD outbreak 
were mostly been felt at the marketing level and 
observed through changes in trade flows for all the 
selected market chains. Agricultural production was 
been disrupted and sometimes hit hard in areas 
strongly affected by the epidemic, but this impact 
was contained at the national level. The impacts on 
prices varied greatly from low to high depending on 
the market chain. The impacts on consumption were 
more closely related to the decrease in purchasing 
power due to the general economic downturn and 
falling producer prices than to massive price increas-
es. However, data on these impacts remain scarce, 
especially in terms of substitution effects on food 
consumption.
The table shows also that some market chains were 
more strongly affected than others: the impacts on 
the potato and cocoa market chains are far stronger 
than for cassava, for example.
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At the time of completing this report, cases were de-
clining in all three countries and some EVD-related 
restriction measures were being lifted. Key issues in-
cluded supporting agricultural trade flows and mar-
ket chains towards recovery while maintaining ef-
forts to counter the virus. General recommendations 
for all market chains are presented first, followed by 
specific recommendations for each market chain.
4.1 General recommendations
The general recommendations cover four areas. They 
aim at encouraging and supporting the recovery of 
activity in the agricultural market chains through: 
1. Establish safe trade corridors based on Pub-
lic Health mitigation measures along market 
chain critical control points (farm work, trade 
circuits and markets).
2. Economic measures that support the recovery 
of agricultural activity (support to input access, 
rescheduling loans, etc.).
3. Additional research at the human-ani-
mal-ecosystem interface on specific topics (the 
role of agricultural market chains in spreading the 
virus, stakeholders’ adaptation strategies in an 
epidemic context, potential changes in consump-
tion modes, etc.).
4. Intersectoral political commitment at the na-
tional and international level.
Public health measures
It is recommended that collaboration between Health 
and Agriculture departments be reinforced so that 
health measures contribute to overcoming the main 
bottlenecks in agricultural market chain function and 
trade flows due to the epidemiological context.
•	 For farmers groups. In areas where EVD prev-
alence is high, ‘return to the farm’ campaigns 
would need to be combined with EVD prevention 
campaigns. Information campaigns and increased 
rural access to hygiene kits (focused on urban ar-
eas until now) will help to ensure the safety of 
group farm work. Keeping a certain distance be-
tween workers and drinking from separate cups 
are examples of cautionary group work measures 
experimented during harvest in some counties in 
Liberia.
•	 For trade roads and international borders. 
Health checks on trade corridors are necessary 
surveillance measures to accompany the lifting of 
restriction measures. The protocol for such corri-
dors should be based on WHO recommendations 
(Sept. 2014). For instance, a health check-point 
could be established on both sides of the border 
to allow health checks on drivers and possibly 
sanitary checks on commodities by the relevant 
health and agriculture agents before the usual 
customs controls. Clear instructions should also 
be provided to law enforcers informing them to 
give priority to the movement of food and com-
modities. In some cases, transporters prefer to 
transport perishable goods such as vegetables at 
night when the weather is cooler. They should 
not be restricted to daylight operations.
•	 For marketplaces. Re-opening key periodic mar-
kets requires intensive communication and sen-
sitization activities for the various stakeholders 
using the marketplace. Moreover, market-places 
should be closed at night and disinfected once a 
week. These measures should be sustained even 
after the epidemic to counter health risks other 
than those linked to EVD. 
Due to limited human and financial resources for 
health checks, key stakeholders in market chains 
should be mobilized: producer organizations, market 
authorities, transport unions, trade associations, ag-
ricultural extension agents, or any other trusted local 
structure. They should be recognized as key actors 
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in risk management rather than merely the targets 
of awareness-raising measures to ensure that mes-
sages conceived jointly are effective and acceptable. 
Market chain stakeholders should participate in in-
tersectoral committees for Ebola control.
In the specific case of long-distance transport and 
trade, the implementation of health measures (e.g. 
temperature controls and truck disinfection) could be 
delegated to transport unions and organized along 
the lines of what has been done in the Abidjan- 
Lagos corridor for HIV/AIDS. Over shorter distances 
and for more informal channels (collectors, small 
traders), marketplaces should serve as relay points, 
distributing information and materials and establish-
ing health protocols. 
Economic measures
It is recommended that incentives, guarantees 
and reassuring messages are urgently provided for 
all market-chain actors. For smallholders in particu-
lar, there is a risk that drops in production will be sus-
tained or even more marked in 2015 because several 
producers had difficulties selling their production or 
sold at a loss this past farming season. Farmers’ de-
cisions on the land areas to be sown will depend on 
their economic capacity, their confidence in being 
able to mobilize collective labour when required and 
guarantees that they will be able to market their pro-
duce at favourable prices.
Economic measures could therefore consist in sup-
porting smallholders through local purchases 
for food aid and support for agricultural inputs. 
Farmers, particularly fruit and vegetable producers, 
need support to access inputs (seeds, tools, fertiliz-
ers, etc.) through subsidies, and to repay loans con-
tracted during the previous farming season.
Additional research at the human-animal- 
ecosystem interface
The present impact assessment has revealed a num-
ber of information gaps in the understanding of 
EVD’s impacts, particularly with regard to livelihoods 
and food and nutrition security. To contribute to fill-
ing these gaps, it is recommended that:
•	 Further scientific studies are undertaken for a 
better understanding of the risk of Ebola spillover 
at the human-animal-ecosystem interface.
•	 Specific studies on individual and collective 
strategies implemented by stakeholders to adapt 
to EVD and mitigate its effects are undertaken.
•	 Specific studies on food consumption due to 
changes in availability and prices are undertaken.
•	 A seminar on the cocoa value chain in West 
Africa (with FAO and Conseil Café Cacao) should 
be organized to alert to the dramatic effects that 
the epidemic could have in countries such as Côte 
d’Ivoire, which is highly dependent on cocoa.
Political commitment
•	 Mobilize donors and regional policy makers. 
While significant amounts of resources were al-
located to containing the epidemic, it is recom-
mended that governments and their partners 
invest in economic activities to boost national 
economies in the post-Ebola period.
•	 Communicate technical recommendations 
at a high political level and, in particular, bring 
them to the attention of regional integration or-
ganizations such as ECOWAS, MRU and WAEMU.
•	 Ensure intersectoral coordination for sup-
porting trade activities in an epidemic con-
text. At national levels, intersectoral coordination 
should involve departments of health, agriculture, 
trade, customs, transport and domestic security. 
At the international level, organizations such as 
WHO, IOM and WCO should collaborate with 
FAO and agree on the best way to implement 
health and economic measures.
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4.2 Specific recommendations  
for market chains
Rice
•	 Farmers	 groups	 and	marketing	 and	 trade	flows	
at domestic and regional levels were affected by 
the restriction measures to limit the spread of the 
outbreak (bans on gatherings, closure of markets, 
etc.) as well as by farmers’ and traders’ fear be-
haviours.
•	 Health	measures	are	recommended	to	encourage	
farmers to resume labour groups farming activi-
ties and traders to collect rice in production areas, 
as well measures to re-open key periodic markets 
that include health measures to reduce risk (infor-
mation campaign, hygiene kits, disinfecting infra-
structure, etc.).
Potatoes (and other horticultural products)
•	 The	closure	of	the	Senegal-Guinea	border	caused	
considerable post-harvest losses, falling producer 
prices and financial losses for producers.
•	 Recommendations	are	to	accompany	the	re-open-
ing of the Senegal-Guinea border with health 
checks on drivers to ensure a safe trade corridor. 
Economic measures are also necessary to support 
smallholders: local purchases for food aid, finan-
cial support to reimburse input loans and purchase 
inputs for the next season.
Cassava
•	 The	impact	of	the	EVD	outbreak	was	limited	be-
cause cassava is less labour intensive than rice, 
produced widely throughout the region and not 
perishable like potatoes. However, regional trade 
dynamics from Sierra Leone have been affected 
by border closures.
•	 Health	checks	and	information	should	accompa-
ny the re-opening of borders to ensure safe trade 
corridors.
Palm oil
•	 Regional	 trade	 flows	 were	 particularly	 affected	
by the closure of cross-border markets, while 
domestic trade was less affected and the interna-
tional market did not suffer from the temporary 
closure of industrial plantations.
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•	 Main	recommendations	are	therefore	to	re-open	
regional markets, e.g. Ganta market in Sierra 
Leone and to support producers in affected areas 
to market their palm oil production themselves.
Domestic animal products
•	 Animal	products	were	affected	by	the	decreased	
purchasing power of consumers, and, for the 
commercial poultry sector, by difficulties access-
ing imported animal feed
•	 The	 flow	 of	 animals	 from	 Mali	 via	 Guinea	 to	 
Sierra Leone and Liberia was reduced. Similarly, 
the trade activity of livestock farmers in Forest 
Guinea to supply Liberia with pigs and poultry 
was hampered.
•	 Animal	 restocking	 should	 be	 targeted	 where	
bushmeat consumption was replaced by con-
sumption of small livestock (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire), or 
where loss of income caused farm decapitaliza-
tion (affected areas). 
•	 Past	 projects,	 designed	 prior	 to	 the	 Ebola	 epi-
demic, to substitute bushmeat with other animal 
products to protect wildlife should be reformulat-
ed in light of the EVD experience.
Bushmeat
•	 Bushmeat	plays	 a	 key	 economic	 and	nutritional	
role in affected areas. Due to EVD, consumption 
fell, especially in urban areas, but without a sig-
nificant substitution effect on other products.
•	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	prepare	 and	 agree	on	 suitable	
regulation and consistent communication to man-
age bushmeat activities in a post-Ebola context.
•	 Bans	 on	 hunting	 and	 bushmeat	 consumption	
could be focused on bats, wild mammals, wild 
antelopes and sick or dead wild animals.
•	 Communication	 on	 risks	 associated	 with	 bush-
meat should also target children in rural areas. 
Cocoa
•	 The	EVD	outbreak	disrupted	cocoa	collection	from	
farms and transport for shipping, led to post-har-
vest losses and affected smallholder access to im-
ported rice. However, there was no impact on the 
global cocoa market due to the three countries’ 
minimal contribution to global production.
•	 Recommendations	 concern	 organizing	 a	 trade	
corridor to facilitate collecting and transporting 
the cocoa production.
•	 The	 impact	 of	 Ebola	 on	 smallholder	 incomes	
should alert to the dramatic effects the epidem-
ic could have in Côte d’Ivoire, which is highly 
dependent on cocoa. 
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Agricultural market chains and  
Ebola: strengthening resilience
The Ebola outbreak was caused by human-to-human 
transmission and although the disease does not rep-
resent a food-related risk, the epidemic has certainly 
had a strong impact on agricultural market chains.
We have examined the impact of Ebola through sev-
en market chains (rice, cassava, horticultural prod-
ucts, palm oil, domestic animal products, bushmeat 
and cocoa) in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. An 
innovative and participatory approach such as this is 
of interest because it allows us to: 
•	 Understand	 the	mechanisms	 by	which	 the	 Ebola	
risk, considered “systemic”, affects other sectors of 
economic and social life (beyond merely the health 
sector) and highlights societies’ vulnerabilities.
•	 Elucidate	and	link	some	of	the	economic	impact	
indicators produced by FAO and other national or 
international institutions.
•	 Reveal	 the	 reactions	 and	 new	 interactions	 be-
tween economic stakeholders within these mar-
ket chains to show how they adapt to the ep-
idemic context, and thus analyse the resilience 
mechanisms of agricultural market chains.
The Ebola epidemic disrupted the functioning of 
regional agricultural market chains. Agricultural 
production was affected (FAO-WFP have estimated 
an average reduction of 12 percent of production 
volumes for staple crops) by difficulties linked to the 
reduced availability of labour due to illness and re-
strictions on mobility. However, above all, it affect-
ed the possibility of collecting and transporting 
agricultural production to consumption areas. This 
disruption was linked to collectors’ reluctance to 
travel to contaminated zones (the number of traders 
decreased by 20 percent according to WFP) and to 
a lesser extent to transport difficulties arising from 
“Ebola checkpoints”, “quarantine zones”, and the 
closure of certain borders. 
These obstacles contributed to reducing farmers’ in-
comes (higher costs of inputs and lower negotiating 
power with collectors whose numbers decreased) 
and to modifying normal price “models” (geograph-
ical and seasonal patterns), thus establishing a con-
text of instability and uncertainty for stakeholders 
within these chains, from producers to consumers. 
Consumer price increases were limited by the low 
purchasing power of an already poor population, 
weakened even further by the global economic 
slowdown. Some prices fell – e.g. potatoes in Guin-
ea (whose potato exports to Senegal were blocked) 
or rice in the Kambia region in Sierra Leone (which 
normally exports to Guinea). 
Because of lack of investment capacity or lack of 
confidence in the marketing possibilities for their 
products at acceptable prices, there was concern 
that producers would reduce their activities in 2015 
(thus increasing food insecurity) even if it was con-
firmed that the epidemic was receding. The number 
of food insecure individuals due to Ebola was esti-
mated in the hundreds of thousands in each country 
and was expected to rise in 2015 (FAO& WFP, 2015; 
FAO & WFP CFSAM 2014).
Over the longer term, it is important to learn lessons 
from this epidemic, especially since emerging dis-
eases specialists believe that such epidemics will in-
crease in frequency and gravity.  Some market chains 
absorbed the shock of the crisis better than others 
and were more efficient in contributing, directly or 
indirectly, to food access for the most fragile house-
holds. The Ebola epidemic can teach us what this 
efficiency is based on, i.e. the resilience as well as the 
vulnerabilities of a market chain from the point of 
view of its contribution to food security in a context 
of a systemic crisis.
Faced with the absence of collectors, better organ-
ized producers were able to market their products 
themselves in consumption zones. With the closure 
of local markets, some sellers opted to become street 
vendors. The consumption of imported rice partly 
decreased in favour of local tubers, and bushmeat 
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in favour of fish or meat from domesticated animals. 
New regional trade circuits were used: through Mali 
to bypass the closure of the Senegal-Guinea border 
or by boat along the coasts to bypass the re-routing 
of shipping lanes. Thanks to their financial capacity, 
social networks and, more generally, their capaci-
ty for speculation, some stakeholders were able to 
benefit from increased price differentials between 
production zones affected by the epidemic and con-
sumption zones.
However, other economic stakeholders within these 
market chains, mostly without storage capacities 
and with weak negotiating power, were hit by re-
strictions. The most affected were stakeholders in 
long market chains (cocoa versus cassava),  more la-
bour- and input-intensive chains (poultry versus fish 
or cassava), chains with weak market diversification 
(cocoa versus palm oil), chains involving perishable 
products (potato versus cassava) and chains employ-
ing salaried labour (industrial cocoa versus rice).
The bushmeat market chain is also considered key 
in this crisis since it could be the source of spillover 
events. Even if such spillovers can be viewed as rare 
events, their consequences are nonetheless disas-
trous. This sector represents an important safety net 
from a nutritional and economic as well as cultur-
al point of view, and a means of controlling pests 
that damage crops. Ebola has affected the bushmeat 
market chain, but it is likely that apart from a lasting 
effect on the consumption of certain species (bats, 
non-human primates) and animals found dead, 
stakeholders will return to their previous activity. The 
fight against poaching is costly and not very effec-
tive; it is thus essential that beyond the ban hurriedly 
implemented during the crisis, the broader scientif-
ic community reflects on realistic and proportionate 
measures to establish during such an epidemic using 
an intersectoral approach that takes into considera-
tion the market chain’s environmental, health, food, 
economic and cultural aspects.
This study also had a special emphasis on local rice 
market chain since local rice is essential to the re-
gion’s food security. It is also emblematic of the epi-
demic’s consequences on agricultural market chains, 
both upstream and downstream. Production was 
disrupted by illness, bans on gatherings, restrictions 
on the movement of people and the workers’ fear of 
going to their fields because of Ebola. These factors 
affected group farm work. Domestic trade flows that 
normally go from rice production areas, particularly 
hit by the epidemic, to consumption areas were dis-
rupted by restrictions on people’s movement and 
goods within the three countries. At the regional 
level, stakeholders in Sierra Leone’s local rice market 
chain also faced difficulties exporting parboiled rice 
to Guinea. Rice imports, which were not significantly 
affected by the epidemic, were able to make up the 
deficit in local production, but this came with the dis-
advantage of increasing the three countries’ import 
dependence and national expenditure on food. 
The challenge of systemic crises in 
a globalized world
Ebola is a systemic risk. Using OECD terminology 
(OECD, 2003), this is a risk that affects the systems 
on which society depends (health, transport, envi-
ronment, telecommunications, etc.) and requires a 
systemic response, which is a new policy approach 
to risk management that includes developing syner-
gies between public and private sectors; informing 
and involving stakeholders and the general public; 
strengthening international co-operation; and mak-
ing better use of technological potential to improve 
research efforts.
The latest Ebola epidemic has taken on new propor-
tions due to the greater connectedness of space and 
increased movement of goods and people within the 
region. It illustrates the intensity of the spread of a 
virus in a globalized, interconnected world. Chain ef-
fects highlight the increasing interdependence of ge-
ographic and economic spaces. These spaces can no 
longer close themselves off to ensure their own se-
curity because isolation would only make them more 
fragile. The market chains covered in this study are 
regional and international market chains. Manpow-
er, inputs, funds/capital and products are all moving 
along the value chain. The challenge is therefore to 
isolate the disease without isolating, and thus ren-
dering fragile, what one seeks to protect. This is a 
growing problem in a globalized world, obliging us 
to rethink the coordination of an increasingly vast 
network of actors. At the same time, this challenge 
also offers new opportunities to develop new forms 
of solidarity. 
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This assessment was prepared during and following 
the FAO technical workshop on the market chain of 
agricultural products affected by the Ebola crisis in 
Dakar, Senegal, in December 2014.
1. Introduction
Several international agencies have carried out risk 
assessments of the introduction of disease through 
consumption of meat from wild animals (CDC, 
WHO, FSA, ECDC/EFSA). These assessments are driv-
en by the understanding that imports of such meat 
are illegal and the volume of trade is very low in com-
parison to other products. Meat from wild animals 
is considered a higher risk for transmitting not only 
the Ebola pathogen, but others as well. The animals 
from which the meat is derived may be reservoirs 
(asymptomatic) or could have been infected at the 
time of hunting; the lack of veterinary checks or an-
imal husbandry (for domestic animals and farmed 
wildlife) for such animals makes it very difficult to 
apply safe hygiene rules. These risk assessments con-
clude that while there is still considerable uncertainty 
about Ebola infection in wildlife, there is a significant 
risk for people who hunt, slaughter, butcher and 
consume the animals, particularly fruit bats, non-hu-
man primates and forest duikers and especially if sick 
or dead animals are consumed.
The following risk assessment will consider the risk 
associated with products other than meat from wild 
animals, namely animal products (derived from pigs 
and poultry) and cash crops including fruits and veg-
etables. 
Unlike an import risk assessment (according to OIE 
guidelines), where the product is considered infected 
or contaminated from the start of the risk pathway, 
this assessment will consider the change in risk not 
only throughout the production process (as with a 
food safety risk assessment, CODEX guidelines) but 
also along the entire market chain. This relatively 
new methodology of market chain analysis allows 
the risk to be assessed for potential product contam-
ination at any stage of the market chain (FAO, 2011). 
2. Hazard identification 
Ebola virus (Zaire strain): The reservoir host for Ebola 
viruses is not confirmed, but is considered likely to be 
the fruit bat (possibly Hypsignathusmonstrosus, Epo-
mopsfranqueti and/or Myonycteristorquata). Other 
animals (mammals), notably non-human primates 
and humans, can be infected and act as virus “prop-
agators” through increased viral shedding. Virus can 
be excreted in vomitus, faeces, urine, blood and less 
commonly (only in severely affected patients) saliva, 
while semen is the last body fluid to be cleared of 
virus once the patient recovers. 
Field studies on Ebola virus are scarce and while me-
ta-analysis has been used to gather the evidence of 
susceptibility to infection for different species, it is 
still unclear which animals serve as vectors for zo-
onotic transmission and which act as dead-end spill-
overs (Olson et al, 2012). Experimentally, several spe-
cies can be infected with Ebola virus: horses, pigs, 
guinea pigs, mice, rats and goats. However, only pigs 
have been experimentally shown to be capable of 
transmitting the disease to other mammals (Wein-
gartl et al, 2012). No other species (avian, reptile, 
fish, insect or plant) have been found infected, either 
experimentally or in a field situation (Leroy, 2004).
The relevance of the observation that dogs may de-
velop a seropositive reaction following close contact 
with infected humans or animals has been assessed 
Annex 2. Rapid Qualitative Risk  
Assessment for agricultural products  
in Ebola-affected countries
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elsewhere (EFSA 2014). Dogs cannot be entirely 
ruled out as being involved in transmission because 
they have been found to undergo serological con-
version; nevertheless they are considered not to be 
implicated in viral ecology during human outbreaks 
(Allela et al, 2005). 
Characteristics of Ebola virus suggest that survival of 
the virus on surfaces is less than a few days, and 
that survival is reduced in both dry conditions and 
when exposed to direct sunlight (Piercy et al, 2010). 
Survival in meat products (fresh or frozen) could be 
up to several days (fresh) or several weeks (frozen). 
Smoking or drying the meat product may reduce 
the survival of virus but will not completely mitigate 
the risk. Heat treatment (for example, during the 
canning process or for at least 1 hour at 60oC) will 
destroy the virus. The virus is inactivated by contact 
with common household disinfectants (bleach, chlo-
rine, hydrogen peroxide). 
3. Assumptions
•	 Certain	 species	 of	 fruit	 bats,	 which	 are	 found	
throughout the affected countries, are consid-
ered reservoir hosts.
•	 The	highest	risk	for	transmission	is	contact	with	a	
symptomatic human (one showing symptoms of 
disease).
•	 Aerosol	 transmission	 is	not	a	transmission	route	
for Ebola virus between humans.
•	 Fomite	transmission	may	be	possible	where	there	
is a high level of environmental contamination 
through contact with burial grounds, hospital 
waste or contact with infected, raw bushmeat. 
•	 Consumption	 of	 fruit	 bats	 and	 meat	 from	 any	
wild animals found sick or dead (bushmeat) is still 
considered a risk in affected regions and should 
be avoided.
•	 The	incubation	period	is	(for	95	percent		of	cases)	 
2-21 days (and can occasionally be as long as 
45 days). Clinical progression of the disease typ-
ically ranges from relative mild symptoms (flu-
like illness) in the first one to two days, then at 
days 4-7, symptoms such as diarrhoea, vomiting, 
headaches and days 7-10, severe symptoms such 
as shock, bleeding and coma leading to death. 
The mortality rate in the current outbreak is ap-
proximately 50 percent and survivors do not gen-
erally develop the symptoms associated with se-
vere clinical disease (days 7-10). The early signs 
of EBOV disease are similar to so many other en-
demic diseases including malaria and diarrhoea 
that general awareness raising of the population 
is crucial for early diagnosis.
WHO (2014) Five keys to safer food:
•	 Keep	clean
•	 Separate	raw	and	cooked
•	 Cook	thoroughly
•	 Keep	food	at	safe	temperatures
•	 Use	safe	water	when	possible	and	raw	materials
In addition, the following should also be taken into 
account:
•	 Separate	raw	meat	from	other	products,	 includ-
ing fruit, vegetables and other commodities.
•	 Do	 not	 allow	 the	 packaging	 or	 commodity	 to	
come into contact with a sick person and prevent 
a sick person from travelling in the same trans-
port as the commodity.
•	 Disinfect	packaging	where	possible	with	house-
hold disinfectants (spray with chlorine [bleach]) if 
there is any indication of contact with a sick person. 
•	 Wash	or	peel	fruit	and	vegetables.	
However, in certain resource-poor settings such as 
rural and urban areas in West Africa, these behav-
iours and activities are not always possible. 
In the unlikely event that any consignment of inter-
est has been in contact with a symptomatic person 
infected with Ebola, there is a very low risk this could 
cross-contaminate one of the handlers, transporters 
or traders at market. Safe hygiene measures (hand 
disinfectant, hand washing etc.) will mitigate this 
very low risk. To avoid infected people entering the 
non-affected country while driving consignments of 
products, for example potatoes, trucks should pass 
through a control point and health checks could be 
carried out. However, it is possible for someone to 
be incubating the disease without showing clinical 
signs51, and because the possibility of carrying out 
51 The likelihood of someone being infected and not exhibiting clinical signs 
depends upon the prevalence of disease in the population, the time since 
infection, incubation period and the time of the journey. Taken together, 
the likelihood of someone being infected and not showing clinical symp-
toms during the journey is considered low. 
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a full clinical examination of transporters is not fea-
sible due to resource constraints, it should be noted 
that the traceability of people entering non-affect-
ed countries presents a considerable challenge but 
unloading consignments at borders to prevent the 
entry of people is detrimental to the quality of the 
products and increases marketing costs. 
4. Risk levels
EFSA /OIE qualitative risk level terminology will be 
used. For further details of these terms and estimates 
of uncertainties, see the table below.
5. Products under consideration
While agricultural trade in West Africa involves many 
products, this risk assessment addresses six key com-
modities that represent the main food groups as well 
as the different market chains involved: rice, pota-
toes, cocoa, palm oil, mangoes, animals and ani-
mal-related products. There is more than one market 
chain for each commodity, so only the most common 
have been addressed. For animals and animal-related 
products, only two species will be covered here (pigs 
and poultry). 
Virus survival depends on time, temperature and ex-
posure to sunlight. To prevent the commodities from 
spoiling, many may be transported at night when 
temperatures are lower and thus virus survival may 
be expected to be longer. The infective dose is only 
known under experimental conditions and therefore 
the reduction in infective dose along the market 
chain cannot be estimated with great confidence; 
nevertheless, product contamination level will de-
pend on the origin of contamination (bat faeces and 
urine, human faeces, vomitus or blood or contact 
with fresh blood or meat from infected animals). 
6. Market chains
Diagrams were drawn up during the December 2014 
workshop. They are part of the risk pathway analysis, 
the second step in risk analysis (FAO, 2011). With a 
full risk assessment, more detail would be included 
to cover all the key players in the value or market 
chain: producers and traders; market organizations; 
veterinary services where important; movement and 
marketing infrastructure, etc.  For brevity, only the 
outline of such groups has been included in the risk 
assessment. The risk assessment considers the fol-
lowing questions and identifies where in the market 
chain these could occur:
•	 Can	a	disease	agent	enter	here?	(source,	route)
•	 Can	a	disease	agent	survive	here?	 
(conditions, treatments)
•	 Would	a	disease	agent	be	noticed	here?	 
(surveillance)
•	 Can	a	disease	agent	be	carried	out	from	here?	
(destination, route)
The coloured boxes correspond to the different risk 
levels – green represents negligible risk; blue repre-
sents the entry route where potential contamination 
from contact with symptomatic people could occur; 
red represents steps in the chain where contamina-
tion could occur and where the pathogen could po-
tentially be found in the product concerned. 
6.1 Rice [Imported]
See the following market chain figure
Rice is imported to affected countries from non-af-
fected countries. In this scenario, the rice is of negli-
gible risk of already being contaminated with Ebola 
virus. The risk enters the market chain only once the 
product enters the affected country via possible con-
tact with Ebola-infected and clinically-ill people at 
Level Terminology
Negligible So rare it can be excluded
Very Low Very rare but cannot be excluded
Low Rare but should be considered
Medium As likely to occur as not
High Very likely to occur
Very High Almost certainly occurs
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the market and involved in the product’s transport. 
The risk is for packaging to become contaminated 
and the virus surviving long enough during transport 
to cross-contaminate the handler or consumer. The 
likelihood of this occurring is very low and signifi-
cantly less than the risk posed to the consumer or 
handler through contact with an infected person. 
Therefore, as long as people are taking safe health 
measures such as regular hand washing, the risk 
is negligible. Another potential route for contami-
nation is from infected fruit bats in the country of 
origin contaminating the product packaging. There 
is considerable uncertainty about the background 
prevalence of Ebola in other fruit bat populations, 
and this is thought to be a similar risk level as any 
contamination of the packaging occurring along the 
market chain.
In terms of the risk of the transporter crossing the 
border and returning to the un-affected country of 
origin, the risk is from the human-to-human contact, 
which may occur during the time spent in the affect-
ed country. It is not possible to monitor people for 
the time spent in the affected country due to lack of 
resources. Therefore the risk for this person contract-
ing Ebola while in the affected country is the same as 
for any person in that country and depends upon the 
level of contact with a symptomatic or convalescent 
person. This risk level is low (rare but does occur52) 
and could be mitigated by safe health measures. 
For movement of consignments between affected 
countries, the same level of care should be taken 
when handling products. This would represent a dif-
ferent market chain but would be similar to that de-
scribed below for commercial mangoes. 
52 In Liberia, 8 362 cases in a population of 4.3 million is a prevalence of 
less than 0.2 percent. Assuming significant under-reporting, at a case 
rate of less than 1 in 100, this is considered a low level if IPCC risk esti-
mates are used – see Table 1 in Annex.
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6.2 Potatoes [locally produced]
See the market chain figure below
Plants, fruits and vegetables are unlikely to become 
infected with Ebola virus (Swanepoel, 1995). For veg-
etables grown underground, the only risk to human 
health is through the product’s contamination after 
contact with an infected person, infected meat or 
contaminated equipment, nightsoil (where human 
waste is collected for fertilizer) or other waste mate-
rial. Potatoes sown and planted in an affected coun-
try are of negligible risk to farm workers, particularly 
in comparison with the risk of contact between farm 
workers themselves. All farm workers should be 
made aware of the clinical signs for Ebola so that if a 
worker falls ill, measures are taken to ensure that the 
ill person does not work with others. Along the mar-
ket chain itself, there is a very low likelihood that po-
tatoes would become contaminated, and then only 
through contact with a clinically-ill person or infected 
products. The virus survival in such a situation will 
depend on the time taken to reach the market, tem-
perature and storage conditions. Packaging may be-
come contaminated under the same circumstances. 
6.3 Rice [locally produced]
See the market chain figure below
For locally-produced rice, which is the main rice con-
sumed in Guinea and Sierra Leone, the market chain 
is essentially similar to that for potatoes and the is-
sues are the same. The risk is from product contami-
nation during harvesting and transport.
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6.4 Cocoa
See the market chain figure below
Cocoa harvesting and processing in West African 
countries that have only artisanal production involves 
manual labour. Even the large commercial producers 
in Côte d’Ivoire require significant levels of manual 
labour, often immigrant workers from neighbouring 
countries. As with palm oil, any risk for the product 
comes from contamination. Fruit bats could be roost-
ing in plantations and therefore contaminated faeces 
or urine may drop onto the cocoa pods. There may 
be a risk of contact for the worker with the product, 
but this is considered very low if not negligible, as 
the risk for becoming infected requires consumption 
not simply contact, because the viral load is expected 
to be far lower in bat faeces than in infected human 
excretions or secretions. During the processing chain, 
the outer husk of the cocoa pod is removed, so any 
residual risk is from contact with clinically-infected 
people working at the processing stage. Further risk 
of contamination, as for all these products, is from 
contact with people along the market chain and the 
likely survival of virus under storage conditions.
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6.5 Palm Oil
See the market chain figure below
There is a very low risk that infected fruit bats are 
present in the region where palm oil is being pro-
duced and that surface contamination could occur 
through bats’ defecating on the palm fruit. Once 
harvested, palm fruit are processed to remove the 
hard shell and press the kernel to produce oil and 
palm extract or kernel cake for animal feed. There-
fore, the likelihood of the virus surviving beyond the 
processing steps is considered negligible. Once pro-
cessed and packaged, the risk arises from contact 
with symptomatic infected people contaminating 
the product or packaging. Final risk of the product 
is therefore dependent upon transport times and 
conditions. If transport takes several days, the likely 
survival of virus is reduced. 
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6.6 Mangoes
See the market chain figure below
The risks along the mango market chain are similar 
to the risks identified along the cocoa market chain. 
Any risk for the product is from contamination along 
the market chain either from human excreta or bats. 
In mango plantations, there is a risk that fruit bats 
contaminate mangos through faeces or saliva dur-
ing consumption.  This risk can be considered low, 
with potential transmission of the Ebola virus to 
farm labourers or those who directly consume the 
freshly-harvested mangoes without washing them. 
During the mangoes’ transport, the survival time will 
depend on the transport method (refrigerated trucks 
will increase survival while direct sunlight decreases 
survival).  If the mangoes are processed into anoth-
er product such as juice or jam prior to transport to 
a non-affected country, the risk can be considered 
negligible. The same issues and mitigation actions 
can be used as for the transport of potatoes, as de-
scribed above.
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6.7 Pig and pig products
See the market chain figure below
Pigs have been experimentally infected with Ebola 
virus and shown to be capable of transmitting the 
disease to other co-confined animals in a laboratory 
situation. There is no evidence to suggest they are 
involved in the epidemiology of disease outbreaks 
in countries where Ebola is present (ILRAD, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the experimental evidence means this 
cannot be entirely excluded. 
If pigs were in contact with infected products such 
as bushmeat, fruit bats or with infected symptomat-
ic people, they could potentially become infected. 
However, they are understood to develop clinical 
signs within several days when they are capable of 
transmitting disease through aerosol contact. As 
pigs are transported as live animals, they should not 
be moved nor enter into the food chain if they are 
showing clinical signs. This is the basis behind all 
OIE agreements for trade in live animals and WTO 
agreements for animals entering the food chain. A 
veterinary inspection and isolation period prior to 
transport would mitigate any risk. 
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6.8 Poultry and poultry products
See the market chain figure below
Poultry and other avian species have not been shown 
to be susceptible to Ebola virus and none has tested 
positive in the field. Therefore, they are not consid-
ered to be infectious at any stage. While there could 
potentially be some contamination of birds through 
contact with clinically-infected humans, it is thought 
to be a very low risk. Processing of products (slaugh-
tering, preparing carcasses, cooking) would miti-
gate any risk. Therefore, contact with farm workers, 
transporters and slaughterhouse workers, in the very 
unlikely event that they were clinically symptomatic, 
is not believed to pose a risk. 
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7. Final Risk Estimates
Commodity Risk of contam-
ination / infection 
at origin
Further processing 
before market or 
border?
Risk of contam-
ination through 
contact with 
symptomatic 
person
Final risk of product 
being contaminated
Rice (Imported) Negligible Only transport Very low Negligible if condi-
tions not suitable for 
virus survival
Rice (locally produced) Very low Yes Very low Negligible if condi-
tions not suitable for 
virus survival
Potatoes (locally 
produced)
Very low Only transport Very low Negligible if condi-
tions not suitable for 
virus survival
Cocoa Very low Yes Very low (negligible if 
cocoa is processed in 
unaffected country)
Negligible if condi-
tions not suitable for 
virus survival
Palm Oil Very low Yes Very low Negligible if condi-
tions not suitable for 
virus survival
Mangoes Very low Only transport Very low Very low for non-com-
mercial trade; negli-
gible for commercial 
trade if processed
Products of Animal 
Origin - pigs
Very low Only transport Very low Very low with no 
controls; negligible 
with correct veterinary 
checks and isolation
Products of Animal 
Origin – other 
including poultry
Negligible Only transport Very low Negligible
Products of animal 
origin – meat of wild 
animals
Medium (High if sick 
or dead animals are 
collected)
Only transport Very low Non-negligible (de-
pends on species of 
animal and the surviv-
al of virus and length 
of journey)
Overall level of confidence in this assessment is sat-
isfactory although for some evidence, namely actual 
prevalence of disease in wild animals including fruit 
bats, survival time of the virus in agricultural packag-
ing and the infection of pigs with Ebola, it is unsat-
isfactory (i.e. further information would strengthen 
confidence but could lead to a change in risk level). 
8. Conclusions
The market chains used for the purposes of the 
workshop covered the main agricultural categories: 
products grown above ground and therefore at risk 
of contamination from fruit bats or other infect-
ed reservoir hosts; products grown below ground, 
which are only at risk from contamination once 
harvested and during the marketing and transport 
processes; products from animals that are not sus-
ceptible to Ebola virus infection and; products from 
animals that are susceptible to Ebola virus infection. 
These products may be destined for local markets or 
the international market or imported from non-af-
fected countries. 
Harvesting, transport and processing is carried out 
by workers who are generally considered fit for work 
and therefore not symptomatic with Ebola virus dis-
ease. This does not entirely preclude the possibility of 
contact with an infected person, but with the poor 
environmental survival of Ebola virus outside an in-
fected body or fluid, the risk is very low, if not neg-
ligible. 
Therefore, the risk assessment concludes that pro-
vided there is no contact with symptomatic infected 
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people during any stage of the market chain, there is 
negligible risk of transmitting Ebola virus in most of 
these products. 
Two products remain of slight concern, firstly, the 
local market-production of mangoes or other fruit 
that could be contaminated on the surface with bat 
faeces or other infected body fluid. Because these 
may be sold locally, the time between harvesting and 
selling may be shorter than the environmental surviv-
al of EBOV and fruit may be eaten directly and not 
processed or cooked.
The second product of concern is pigs. As there is ex-
perimental evidence for pigs being infected and able 
to transmit disease, including via the aerosol route, 
care should be taken that pigs are not exposed to 
symptomatic human cases. In the event of infection, 
pigs are expected to show severe clinical signs and 
therefore a period of quarantine before trading the 
animals and a veterinary certification that the ani-
mals are in good health will mitigate the risk.
9. References
Allela, L., Bourry, O., Pouillot, R., Delicat, A., 
Yaba, P., Kumulungui, B., Rouquet, P., Gonzalez, 
J.P. and Leroy, E.M. (2005) Ebola virus antibody 
prevalence in dogs and human risk. Emerging Infec-
tious Diseases 11: 385-390
Atherstone, C., Roesel, K. & Grace, D. (2013) Eb-
ola risk assessment in the pig value chain in Uganda. 
ILRI Research Report 34. Nairobi, Kenya: Internation-
al Livestock Research Institute. ISBN 92-9146-350-7
EFSA (2014) An update on the risk of transmission 
of Ebola virus (EBOV) via the food chain. EFSA Jour-
nal 12: 3884.
ECDC & EFSA (2014) Risk related to household pets 
in contact with Ebola cases in humans. EFSA Journal 
12:3930.
FAO (2011) A value chain approach to animal dis-
eases risk management. Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations, Rome.ISBN 978-
92-5-106861-8
Leroy, E.M., Rouquet, P., Formenty, P., Souquiere, 
S., Kilbourne, A., Froment, J-M., Bermejo, M., 
Smit, S., Karesh, W., Swanepoel, R., Zaki, S.R. & 
Rollin, P.E. (2004) Multiple Ebola virus transmission 
events and rapid decline of Central African wildlife. 
Science. 303: 387-390.
Olson, S.H., Reed, P., Cameron, K.N., Ssebide, 
B.J., Johnson, C.K., Morse, S.S., Karesh, W.B., 
Mazet, J.A.K. &Joly, D.O. (2012) Dead or alive: an-
imal sampling during Ebola haemorrhagic fever out-
breaks in humans. Emerging Health Threats 5: 9134 
DOI: 10.3402/ehtj.v5i0.9134.
Piercy, T.J., Smither, S.J., Stweard, J.A., Eastaugh, 
L & Lever, M.S. (2010) The survival of filoviruses in 
liquids, on solid substrates and in a dynamic aerosol. 
J ApplMicrobiol. 109: 1531-1539.
Weingartl, H.M., Embury-Hyatt, C., Nfon, C., Le-
ung, A., Smith, G. &Kobinger, G. (2012) Transmis-
sion of Ebola virus from pigs to non-human primates.
Scientific Reports. 2: 811 DOI: 10.1038/srep00811
World Bank (2014) Population data.
http://data.World Bank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL
67
Risk level Definition Expanded description
Negligible Event is so rare, does not merit consideration The chance of the event occurring is so small it does not 
merit consideration in practical terms (i.e. < 0.1% proba-
bility); it is not expected to happen for years;
Very low Event is very rare, but cannot be excluded The event is not expected to occur (very rare) but it is 
possible (i.e. >0.1-1% probability); it is expected to occur 
at least annually
Low Event is rare, but does occur The event may occur occasionally (rare) (i.e. >1-10% 
probability); expected to occur at least monthly
Medium Event occurs regularly The event occurs regularly (i.e. >10-66% probability); 
expected to occur at least fortnightly
High Event occurs very often The event will happen more often than not (i.e. ≥66-90% 
probability); expected to occur at least weekly
Very high Event occurs almost certainly The event will undoubtedly happen (i.e. >90% probabili-
ty); expected to occur at least daily
Level of confidence Definition
Unsatisfactory Further research very likely to have impact on confidence of 
information and likely to change assessment
Satisfactory Further research likely to have impact on confidence of  
information and may change assessment
Good Further research unlikely to change confidence in the  
information
10. Additional information
Table 10. Definitions for qualitative risk terms based on EFSA (2006) and OIE (2004) with expanded descriptions adapted  
from NHS (2008), IPCC (2005), and Kahn et al., (1999)
Table 11. Definitions for the level of confidence in the risk estimate given the evidence used; based on definitions from EFSA, 
2006; ECDC, 2011, Spiegelhalter & Riesch, 2011
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Main conclusions from the impact 
assessment
.
1. A relatively limited impact on agriculture 
production:
•	 Production was affected by labour short-
ages (due to illness, restrictions on gatherings, 
movements of people, etc.) for products such as 
rice that rely on farmers’ groups for planting and 
harvesting. However, the decrease in national 
rice production was contained (drops between 4 
and 12 percent) thanks to the increased use of 
family labour. This has been further described in 
the FAO/WFP CFSAM impact assessment studies. 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4311e.pdf
2. Severe disruption of market chains due to 
movement restrictions and the fear factor 
•	 Although	 the	 risk of transmitting the Ebola 
virus via food products (except for bushmeat) 
is negligible, as shown by the rapid qualitative 
risk management assessment, certain market 
chains have been severely affected by EVD. The 
major disruption of market chains because 
of EVD was largely due to difficulties collect-
ing and trading agricultural products.
•	 Emerging regional markets activity was also 
disrupted (rice, palm oil cassava and animal 
products).
•	 The	 disease	 increased the price differential 
between production and consumption areas. 
3. A major impact on income generation and 
purchasing power
•	 There was an overall loss of household in-
come and purchasing power. This is related to 
the difficulties in trading farm production but also 
to a broader decline in economic activity. Some 
indicators show an adaptation of food systems 
to changes in purchasing power and food item 
availability (e.g. rice substituted with cassava).
•	 Restriction	measures	and	traders’	fear	of	collect-
ing production in affected areas reduced produc-
er incomes. Lower producer prices were report-
ed for rice, potatoes and cocoa because of the 
difficulty selling surpluses, significant post-har-
vest losses and producers’ lower negotiating 
power owing to fewer traders. Higher produc-
tion costs could not translated into higher sales 
prices given consumers’ lower purchasing power 
because of job and income losses. This reduced 
producers’ economic margins and raises concerns 
about their investment capacity and confidence 
for planting for the next season. 
•	 Traders with less financial and social capital 
have also suffered from restriction measures. 
Main recommendations
General recommendations:
•	 Establish safe trade corridors based on Pub-
lic Health mitigation measures along market 
chains: information campaigns, hygiene kits and 
sanitary controls are essential to support farmer 
group activities and regulate the re-opening of 
borders and markets. All stakeholders (producer 
organizations, market authorities, transport un-
ions, trade associations, agricultural extension 
agents, etc.) represent key actors in this risk man-
agement. Incentives, guarantees and reassuring 
messages for all market-chain actors are required.
•	 Boosting economic and agricultural relat-
ed activities. Smallholder farmers could bene-
fit from local purchases for food aid and finan-
cial support for agricultural inputs to encourage 
planting for the next season. 
Annex 3. Summary of conclusions and 
recommendations
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•	 Disease surveillance and response at the 
human-animal-ecosystem interface: the risk 
of Ebola spillover at the human-animal-ecosystem 
interface, market-chain actors’ adaptation strate-
gies and changes in food consumption need to 
be further explored. Multidisciplinary approaches 
to disease emergence and intersectoral coordina-
tion must be put into place at local, subnational 
and national levels.
Specific recommendations for market chains are 
as follows: 
•	 Rice: develop and communicate on health pre-
vention measures to encourage farmer group ac-
tivity and traders to collect rice in production are-
as, and to encourage and monitor the re-opening 
of key periodic markets.
•	 Potatoes (and other horticultural products): 
support the re-opening of the Senegal-Guinea 
border with health checks and support smallhold-
ers in reimbursing input loans and purchasing in-
puts for the next season.
•	 Cassava: support the re-opening of cross-border 
markets with health checks and information to 
ensure safe trade corridors.
•	 Palm oil: re-open regional markets, e.g. Ganta 
market in Sierra Leone and support producers in 
affected areas to market their palm oil production 
themselves.
•	 Cocoa: organize a trade corridor in order to fa-
cilitate the collection and transport of the cocoa 
production and raise awareness of the effects the 
epidemic could have in Côte d’Ivoire (highly de-
pendent on cocoa). A seminar on cocoa in West 
Africa would also be useful to reflect on the im-
pacts the epidemic could have in countries such 
as Côte d’Ivoire
•	 Bushmeat: prepare and agree on suitable regu-
lation and consistent communication to manage 
bushmeat activities in a post-Ebola context; focus 
bans on hunting and bushmeat consumption on 
specific species (bats, wild mammalian species, 
wild antelopes and sick or dead wild animals); 
and target children in rural areas in order to com-
municate the risks associated with bushmeat. 
•	 Other animal products: encourage animal re-
stocking where bushmeat consumption has been 
replaced by consumption of small livestock (e.g. 
Côte d’Ivoire), or where loss of income has caused 
farm decapitalization.
70
Type of Virus: Filovirus, Ebolavirus (Zaire)
Reservoir: Unknown (fruit bats cannot be excluded)
Secreted in: Blood (mainly), faeces, vomitus, (sali-
va, semen, breast milk, tears cannot be excluded but 
less important role).  Virus does not spread via air-
borne transmission.  
Incubation Period:  2-21 Days
Clinical Signs and Viral Shedding: Sudden onset 
of fever, fatigue, headache and sore throat. Followed 
by period of vomiting, diarrhoea and impaired liver 
and kidney function.  In some cases rashes form and/
or bleeding occurs.  Humans are not infectious until 
severe clinical signs manifest.
Chemical Inactivation:
Sensitive to common household disinfectants
3% Acetic Acid
1% Glutaraldehyde
Alcohol-Based Products
1:10 dilution of 5.25% household bleach  
(10 minutes)
Physical Inactivation:
5 minutes at boiling temperatures
30-60 minutes at 60 degrees C
Gamma irradiation combined with 1%  
glutaraldehyde
Survival Outside Host:
Blood: weeks
In the dark under ambient conditions for around 20 
hours
Dried in tissue culture for 50 days in 4 degrees C 
(note: not inactivated by refrigeration/freezing)
Animals shown to be infected by virus via serol-
ogy: note – role in transmission is unknown.
Primates (clinical signs and high mortality); Bats (no 
clinical signs, no mortality); Antelopes (possible spill-
over exposure); Duikers (possible spillover exposure); 
Porcupines (possible spillover exposure); Dogs (pos-
sible spillover exposure); Rodents (experimental evi-
dence only); Pigs (Experimental evidence only)
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Ebola trade corridors
Agricultural market chains have been severely dis-
rupted by movement restrictions applying to goods 
and people: establishment of cordons sanitaires 
around quarantine zones, Ebola checkpoints, closure 
of markets and closure of international borders. Re-
storing, even partially, the functioning of agricultural 
market chains is a critical factor to minimize the in-
direct effects of the [Ebola] epidemic by protecting 
food security and maintaining economic activity in 
the affected zones and within the wider region. 
According to the rapid qualitative risk assessment, 
product safety is not a major concern regarding Ebo-
la; the major risk of contamination and propagation 
along the market chain is related to the movement 
and gathering of the chains’ stakeholders (producers, 
handlers, traders, end-buyers). Therefore, addressing 
risks along the market chain requires a focus on hu-
man health issues when people gather (for collective 
field work or at marketplaces) and during transport, 
in particular for-cross border transport. The latter 
issue is addressed here through the recommendation 
of establishing or at least facilitating the functioning 
of trade corridors.
Trade corridors, in a context of epidemics such as Eb-
ola, need to rely on sanitary controls on main trade 
roads (Ebola checkpoints) as is done in Liberia or at 
cross-border points (corridors could be implement-
ed between Senegal and Guinea or between Libe-
ria and Guinea). Ebola checkpoints are a necessary 
measure to control the spread of the disease, but 
farmers and traders perceive these checkpoints as 
barriers to trade. It is possible to maintain rigorous 
checks and ease farmers’ and transporters’ fears at 
the same time through safe healthy trade corridors. 
When crossing borders or cordons sanitaires, a zone 
could be established on either side of the border 
or cordon to allow sanitary controls on drivers and 
possibly commodities by the relevant officials (health 
and agriculture officials in charge of phytosanitary 
controls) before the usual customs controls (for bor-
der crossing). 
Clear instructions should also be provided to law en-
forcers, particularly at checkpoints and borders, in-
structing them to give priority to the movement of 
food and commodities. In some cases, transporters 
prefer to transport perishable goods (e.g. vegeta-
bles) at night when the weather is cooler. These trad-
ers should not be restricted to daylight operations 
but the checkpoint mechanism should be adjusted 
to accommodate this schedule. 
Corridors may also be subject to illegal barriers and 
illicit charges or other road harassment (see Border 
Alliance road governance reports). These elements 
must be taken into account when studying the fea-
sibility of developing health checks on main trade 
roads. Regular monitoring and evaluation of such 
corridors should be also planned so that they can be 
constantly adapted in the rapidly-evolving context of 
a crisis. 
Implementing Ebola trade corridors should be con-
sidered as a medium-term response to the Ebola 
outbreak. However, in the long term, tools should 
be developed to address safety issues in relation to 
regional trade as a whole, rather than producing reg-
ulations and tools specific to each sanitary issue.
Regulatory tools available for  
implementing safe trade corridors
The protocol for organising Ebola trade corridors 
needs to focus on market-chain stakeholders. In-
ternational Health Regulation (IHR 2005) and WHO 
guidance on “Ebola event management at points of 
entry”53 could be adapted for the transport of agri-
cultural products, and would be useful to mitigate 
the risk related to local and regional trade (the major 
concern of this study).
In response to the Ebola epidemic, Mali has organ-
ized health checks on its border with Guinea. Sene-
Annex 6. Concept of corridors
53 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/event-manage-
ment-poe/en/
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gal, like several other countries, has also established 
EVD surveillance guidelines for border areas (see be-
low) and a plan for capacity building necessary for 
implementing IHR at points of entry. However, these 
checks are costly and difficult to maintain in the long 
term and illustrate the difficulties in implementing 
IHR in countries with limited resources. 
For overland posts (which are the main points for re-
gional trade of merchandise), Senegal estimates the 
cost of its three-year action plan to be FCFA 48.9 
million, with an additional cost of FCFA 61.8 million 
for each land border post (Ministère de la santé et de 
l’action sociale, 2014).
Other measures such as those adopted by port au-
thorities (available on http://www.ebolamaritime-
awareness.com/) could be adapted for terrestrial 
trade.
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The concepts of trade, health and 
humanitarian corridors 
Implementing Ebola trade corridors or securing ex-
isting trade routes to re-establish safe trade with a 
humanitarian/food security objective could be based 
on past experiences of implementing or developing 
trade, health and humanitarian corridors.
Trade corridor
The concept of a trade corridor originates from in-
itiatives aimed at enhancing trade access (by road, 
air and sea) as a means of development. They are 
modelled on the ancient silk route in Asia. In Van 
Pelt et al. (2003) they are defined as follows: “Trade 
corridors54 are streams of products, services, and 
information moving within and through communi-
ties in geographic patterns according to a matrix”. 
The World Bank has developed tools for improving 
the performance of existing trade corridors and for 
“overcoming local barriers to global connectivity”.
In West Africa, several initiatives resemble this con-
cept. For example, the “USAID West Africa Trade Hub 
(WATH)55” project, which aims to establish “good 
road governance” (notably within the limitations of 
ineffective controls and corruption) and supports a 
partnership of public and private actors as part of 
a “borderless alliance”. Every three months, in col-
laboration with UEMOA’s Observatory of Abnormal 
Practices and USAID’s Agribusiness and trade promo-
tion project, these initiatives produce a map for West 
African countries (see below) showing control posts 
(health, phytosanitary and zoosanitary) and obsta-
cles (including illicit activities) to regional trade. 
With the technical assistance of WATH, the Perma-
nent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in 
the Sahel (CILSS) also investigates road problems for 
five trade corridors within CILSS/ECOWAS territory 
as part of its Regional Support Programme (RSP) to 
improve market access financed by USAID Feed the 
Future. The reports do not cover Guinea, Liberia or 
Sierra Leone, but it was envisaged that CILSS would 
monitor livestock trade in the Bamako-Conakry cor-
ridor from February 2014.
Health corridor and cordon sanitaire 
The term “health corridor” is rarely used. Health 
corridors have been established in connection with 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For example, a project began 
along the Abidjan-Lagos axis in 2000, with funding 
from the World Bank, with the aim of limiting the 
spread of AIDS along that axis by means of informa-
tion, education and the distribution of condoms56. 
Another similar project in Mail (Project Corridor, with 
UN finance) run by the NGO JIGI, works to prevent 
the spread of AIDS along major road routes from 
Mali to Niger. Similar activities could be developed 
for other health issues such as Ebola.
Trade corridor and cordon sanitaire
The concept of “commodity-based trade” lies at the 
interface between cordon sanitaire and trade corri-
dor. It is an example of a non-geographical sanitary 
standard proposed by certain parties interested in 
the environment and development (IIED, STEPS) as a 
less-limiting alternative in southern Africa to the cur-
rent geographically-based approaches (disease-free 
zones) used to allow livestock products to be export-
ed to countries free of foot and mouth disease. Com-
modity based trade is strongly based on risk assess-
ment. Unlike other approaches that try to eliminate 
risk from a zone (disease-free zones) or value chain 
54 http://continental1.org/trade-corridors
55 http://www.watradehub.com/fr
56 http://www.sante.gouv.tg/index.php?option=com_content&view=ar-
ticle&id=146:reunion-du-comite-directeur-de-lorganisation-du-corri-
dor-abidjan-lagos-a-lome&catid=1:actualites-du-ministere&Itemid=2
The Borderless Alliance, officially launched in 
May 2012 with support from the USAID West 
Africa Trade Hub and its partners, provides an 
independent, sub-regional platform for leading 
producers, traders, transporters and financiers 
to propose and advocate for systemic and prac-
tical improvements to the movement of goods, 
transport, capital and services across West Africa. 
Guided by international best practices, sound re-
search and their Code of Ethics, Borderless Alli-
ance members work together to promote change 
through dialogue and action – Extract from 
http://www.borderlesswa.com/what-border-
less#sthash.o0JIHfqK.dpuf
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(compartments), CBT assesses the risk inherent in a 
particular product and this is why it is of particular 
interest in the current situation “CBT is dependent on 
applying risk management methods (of which there 
are many) to reliably counter specific biological haz-
ards posed by individuals, commodities or products. 
Each specific commodity/product requires specific 
measures. For many commodities & products this 
can be achieved irrespective of whether dangerous 
infections occur in the area of production or not. 
Ideally risk mitigation incorporates a matrix of risk re-
duction mechanisms”57. In addition, FAO’s document 
“value-chain management of animal diseases” (FAO, 
2011) contains some of the building blocks for con-
structing a corridor with humanitarian, health and 
trade objectives.
Humanitarian corridor 
Developing trade corridors in the context of Ebola is 
also related to the idea that it is necessary to bring 
aid to the direct victims of the Ebola epidemic - those 
infected by the virus - as well as those indirectly af-
fected by secondary effects of the virus such as move-
ment restriction and food scarcity. In this respect, it 
borrows from the concept of humanitarian corridors: 
“a humanitarian corridor is a space established in 
a zone devastated by war or catastrophe to allow 
the passage of humanitarian aid”. Its function is to 
provide access to victims to bring them emergency 
aid. Creating and respecting humanitarian corridors 
was envisaged by UN resolutions but member states 
were under no obligation (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2000)58. 
Humanitarian corridors are established by organiza-
tions such as WFP or NGOs intervening in emergency 
situations (e.g. Médecins sans frontières). 
57 http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/48/4153/Commodity%20based%20
trade%20in%20context%20of%20rural%20development%20in%20
Southern%20Africa-Presentation.pdf
58 www.msf.fr/sites/www.msf.fr/files/lacces_aux_victimes_principe_humani-
taire_ou_slogan_politique.pdf
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Annex 7. List of interviewed persons
Name First Name Institute Function
BARRY Mamadou Billo IRAG. Guinea Scientific director
BAH Marianne FAO Sierra Leone Expert nutrition
BEAVOGUI Famoï IRAG. Guinea General director
BEBAY Charles FAO Mali FAO Ectad
BELLO Nathan Nestlé Côte d’Ivoire Research & Development Cacao
MBOUP Cheikh Mbacke Nestlé Guinea Research & Development
CISSE Brahima CILSS Burkina Faso Expert market
COLY Malang WHO Senegal EHA Focal Point
DEM Halatou Private Mali Trader Fonio
DIALLO Diawo ENAE Macenta/ Min. de l’Enseigne-
ment Technique et de la formation 
professionnelle Guinea
Director
DIALLO Kourahoye Fédération des paysans du Fouta 
Djallon (FPFD) Guinea
Trade expert
FAYE Christophe Laba OIM Senegal
GAUTIER Charles Nestlé Côte d’Ivoire Regional green coffee buyer
GUEYE Mamadou FAO Senegal Expert, resilience
ROBERTS Jo-Lind OIM, Senegal Head of office
KAMARA Prince Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Food Security (MAFFS), Sierra Leone
National Programme Coordinator of 
the Smallholder Commercialization 
Project
KALIVOGUI Koikoi Fédération des Eleveurs de Macenta 
Guinea
President
KEFING Conde FAO Guinea Anthropologist
KOLIE Alexandre Caritas Nzérokoré Guinea Caritas Nzérékoré
KOUAME Pondo Nestlé Côte d’Ivoire Supply chain, cassava
LAMARANA Souare Mamadou FAO Guinea Coordinator TCP and communications
MAHMOOD Nazir Centre de recherche de Rokupr 
Sierra Leone
Economist
MARTEL Philippe APDRA Guinea Coordinator project
MOUILLEZ Anne-Cécile WFP Senegal Regional Officer, Food security
MWESIGWA David FAO, Sierra Leone Expert, Emergency
PETERS Samuel FAO Liberia Agronomist
RENK Simon WFP Senegal Market specialist
SONKO Mamadou FAO Senegal Focal point FAO Senegal
TEDO Mario FAO Guinea Expert Social mobilization
THOUILLOT Floriane Gret Guinea Country Officer
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Annex 8. Technical consultation meeting
Jour 1 - Tuesday 9 December
Time
Session 1 : Meeting opening
Chair: Vincent Martin (FAO)
Intervenants
08:30 - 08:40 Welcome - Registration
08:40 - 08:50 Opening statements Vincent Martin (FAO)
Denis Depommier (Cirad)
08:50 - 09:20 Presentation of the Meeting : objectives, programme  
and presentation of participants
Patrick David (FAO)
Session 2 : Overview of EVD impacts 
Chair : Arlène Alpha (Cirad)
09:20 - 09:35 Impacts of the EVD outbreak on the agricultural sector,  
flow of agricultural products and food security
Brenda Lazarus (FEWS NET)
09:35 - 09:50 Discussions
09:50 - 10:05 The use of a market chain approach for analysing the  
impacts of Ebola
Muriel Figuié (Cirad)
10:05 - 10:15 Questions and answers
10:15 - 10:45 Pause
Session 3 : Analysis of the market chains
Chair : Patrick David (FAO)
10:45 - 11:00 Case studies : rice, potatoes, fruits and vegetables Arlène Alpha (Cirad)
11:00 - 11:20 Discussions
11:20 - 11:40 Case studies : cassava, palm oil, cocoa and animal products Muriel Figuié (Cirad)
11:40 - 12:00 Discussions
Session 4 : Solutions for the market chains 
(group work) Chair : Patrick David (FAO)
12:00 -12:10 Presentation of guidelines for group work Arlène Alpha (Cirad)
12:10 - 12:30 Constitution of work groups :
• Group 1 : rice, potatoes, cassava 
• Group 2 : palm oil, cocoa and animal products
Animateurs :
Arlène Alpha (Cirad)
Muriel Figuié (Cirad)
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 17:00 Group work Facilitators and rapporteurs
Sustaining market chains and trade of agricultural products 
in the context of the EVD outbreak in West Africa
Technical consultation Meeting – 9 & 10 December 2014 Dakar, Senegal
PROGRAMME
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Day 2 - Wednesday 10 Décember
Time Session 4 : Solutions for market chains (group work) Intervenants
08:30 - 12:30 Group work Facilitators and rapporteurs
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
Session 5 : Conclusions of the group work
Chair : Helen Roberts
14:00 - 14:40 Presentation of the group work discussions Rapporteurs
14:40 - 15:15 Discussions
15:15 - 15:45 Pause
15:45 - 16:00 Conclusions and recommandations Muriel Figuié, 
Arlène Alpha (Cirad)
16:00 - 16:40 Discussions
16:40 - 16:50 Evaluation
Session 6 : Meeting closure
16:50 - 17:00 Closing remarks Vincent Martin (FAO)
79
Country Name Institute
Côte d’Ivoire Ms Aline OGBA Ministry of Commerce
Côte d’Ivoire Mr Christophe Auguste DOUKA Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Côte d’Ivoire Mr Coulibaly  DONIKPO FAO Côte d’Ivoire
Guinea Ms  Nana  GROVOGUI Ministry of Commerce 
Guinea Mr Koikoi KALIVOGUI Fédération des Eleveurs de la Préfecture de 
Macenta
Guinea Mr Jesse BONWITT Consultant FAO
Guinea Mr MamadouKaba SOUARE FAO-Guinea
Guinea Bissau Mr Mama Samba EMBALO National Association of Farmers of Guinea-Bissau
Guinea Bissau Mr Rui Jorge Alves da FONSECA FAO Guinea-Bissau
Liberia Ms. Angie  HOWARD Private Entrepreneur
Mali Mr Bourema KONE IER/ECOFIL
Mali Mr Cheick HAIDARA CNOP
Sierra Leone Mr Brima BANGURA MAFFS
Sierra Leone Mr Joseph  BRIMA FAO Sierra Leone
Senegal Mr Ousmane MBAYE Department of Interior Trade
Senegal Mr AmadouAbdoul SY Market Regulation Agency
Senegal Mme Julie BRAYER MANKOR Ambassy of France in Senegal
Senegal Mr Alexandre SERON Oxfam
Senegal Mr SidyGuèye NIANG Oxfam
Senegal Mr Mitima DJUMA Save the Children 
Senegal Mr Eric HAZARD Save the Children 
Senegal Mr Malick FAYE FAO-Senegal
Senegal Mr Jan EIJKENAAR ECHO
Senegal Ms. Brenda LAZARUS FEWS NET
Niger Mr Mahamane Nasser RABIOU ALMADJIR FEWS NET
Senegal Mr Simon RENK WFP
Senegal Mr Matthieu TOCKERT WFP
Senegal Ms Aita GUEYE CEDEAO /ARAA National Committee
UK Ms Helen ROBERTS Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)
USA Ms Lindsey MCCRICKARD Développement Alternative Inc. (DAI)
France Ms Muriel FIGUIÉ Cirad
Burkina Faso Ms Arlène ALPHA Cirad
Senegal Mr Michael NGONGI FAO
Senegal Mr Vincent MARTIN FAO REOWA
Senegal Mr Patrick DAVID FAO REOWA
Senegal Mr Pape Boubacar SOUMARE FAO REOWA
Senegal Ms Oriane TUROT FAO REOWA
Participants list of the technical consultation meeting (Dakar, 9-10 Dec 2014)
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Country Name Institute
Senegal Mr Julien GAVELLE FAO REOWA
Ghana Mr Jacques CONFORTI FAO RAF
Senegal Mr Alexandre SERON OXFAM
Senegal Mr Oumar DIOUF FAO
Senegal Mr Youssouf DIEME CCIAD
Senegal Mr Philipp KONE FAO REOWA
Guinea Mr Sear dam BA OXFAM AMERICA 

